The well-known free-rider hypothesis is examined experimentally to see (i) whether individuals behave systematically as free riders when systematic incentives to do so are created, and (ii) the extent to which free riding actually occurs. Though the experiment's participants behaved in accordance with the hypothesis, the quantitative extent to which such behavior occurred was rather modest. From this it may be concluded that the free-rider hypothesis as presently stated indicates an incompleteness in standard public microeconomics rather than providing a description of the real world.

An opportunity to compare economic performance under substantially different levels of regulation is afforded by the differences in the regulatory environments of U. S. and Canadian railroads. We find that the less regulated Canadian railroads have achieved far higher productivity growth than have U. S. railroads. Furthermore, in spite of natural conditions favoring U. S. railroads, Canadian railroads have achieved a higher level of productivity. These findings for the typical U. S. and Canadian railroad are borne out by similar results for specific railroads. Had U. S. railroad productivity grown at the Canadian rate, U. S. railroad costs would be several billion dollars less each year.