Knowledge that Transforms

Contrary to conventional economic growth theory, which reduces a country's output to one aggregate variable (GDP), product diversity is central to economic development, as recent “economic complexity” research suggests. A country's product diversity reflects its diversity of knowhow or “capabilities”. Researchers proposed the Economic Complexity Index (ECI) and the country Fitness index to estimate a country's number of capabilities from international export data; these measures predict economic growth better than conventional variables such as human capital. This paper offers a simpler measure of a country's knowhow, Log Product Diversity (or LPD, the logarithm of a country's number of products), which can be derived from a one-parameter combinatorial model of production in which a set of knowhows combine with some probability to turn raw materials into a product. ECI and log-fitness can be interpreted theoretically (using the combinatorial model) and empirically as potentially noisy estimates of LPD; moreover, controlling for natural resources, the simple measure better explains the cross-country differences in GDP and in GDP per capita.

We explore how multimarket contact (MMC) explains competitors' intellectual property (IP) infringement-litigation dynamics. We build on role congruity theory to propose that the role played by each firm in shared markets generates expectations about their behavior, determining which of the following dynamics arise: mutual forbearance (low probability of IP infringement and high probability of litigation) or mimetic behavior (high probability of IP infringement and low probability of litigation). We look into two possible roles, imitators and innovators, and claim that (1) mutual forbearance dynamics are more likely to arise when firms play the role of innovators, whereas (2) mimetic behavior dynamics are more likely to arise when firms play the role of imitators. We find support for our predictions in a sample of 813 patent infringement cases in the biopharmaceutical industry. Increasing MMC from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean leads to a 21.6 (20.6) percent decrease in the probability of infringement and a 22.7 (65.1) percent increase in the probability of litigation after infringement when the rival (focal firm) plays the role of an innovator in shared markets. Alternatively, this increase in MMC leads to a 14.3 % increase (no increase) in the probability of infringement and a 5.2 (16.4) percent decrease in the probability of litigation when the rival (focal firm) plays the role of an imitator in shared markets.

In this study, we use embeddedness and boundaryless career perspectives to investigate the extent to which Britain's withdrawal from the European Union (‘Brexit’) led business, economics and management academics to consider emigrating. Using a representative survey of two partially overlapping groups, we find that the impact of Brexit was surprisingly broad and nuanced. In particular, individuals who were born in the UK, but had obtained citizenship of another country, and foreign-born academics who obtained UK citizenship prior to the Brexit referendum have considered leaving the country, implying a broad discontent from mobile and less embedded individuals. Surprisingly, we did not find that the reputation of the institution where participants work, or differences in levels of academic seniority, influenced whether they were considering emigrating. More productive researchers are more likely to have considered emigrating, suggesting that Brexit may lead to a ‘hollowing out’ of UK research in the long term. However, personal circumstances, such as having children, or length of tenure, also entered into scholars' intention to emigrate. The results imply that managers should act to address the potential losses, and policy makers need to support the higher education sector, to ensure its sustainable competitive performance.

Enforcing a firm's patents is crucial for defending its competitive advantage. CEOs are central for making these strategic decisions but we know little about how their individual incentives shape their decision-making. We integrate theory from outcome-based CEO compensation designs into models explaining firms' decisions to become plaintiffs in patent litigation. Based on how compensation shapes time horizons and risk-taking of CEOs, we predict that CEO compensation tied to stock increases the firm's likelihood to enforce patents, while bonuses and stock options reduce it. Further, we reason that the tenacity of patent disputes in an industry creates a boundary condition for the effects of CEO compensation because they curtail the degree of agency that CEOs have for incorporating their personal incentives when making litigation decisions for the firm. We test these hypotheses for 2302 US firms with 4420 different CEOs and 3451 patent litigation cases between 1997 and 2015 and find support for all hypotheses with the exception of the boundary condition for stocks as CEO compensation. These findings advance existing theory on firms' decision-making on patent litigation by explicating how firm and CEO incentives can diverge with direct consequences for the likelihood of litigation to occur.

The assessing of a pool of competing projects is a challenging task for scientific panels at funding agencies. Using large-scale and rich data from a broad set of panels from the UK's largest research council, we explore whether scientific panels treat overlapping applications from the same institution in a selection round differently. Building on previous research that suggested that panels may favour institutional diversity in funding outcomes, we find that applications at the margin of the funding decision are less likely to be funded when an application from the same institution is also funded. However, we find little evidence of welfare losses associated with this outcome. The implications of these findings for understanding the role of panels in shaping of scientific funding are also examined.

The paper examines the concept of tokenizing assets on public permissionless blockchains such as Ethereum, Algorand or Avalanche. It starts with an overview of the core principles and components of public blockchains, such as the ownership attribution and efficient transaction processing. The paper argues that tokenization could simplify and streamline back-office operations, enable new interactions between issuers, financial firms and investors, and allow novel service models in digital asset issuance and management. The paper then examines the functions and potential usage of tokens, comparing and contrasting traditional and digital assets. It also discusses the mechanisms for token issuance and potential issues that may arise from tokenizing existing assets. The challenges and advantages of digital assets for implementing traditional asset functions such as dividend payments, shareholder voting, and shareholder communications are also discussed. Finally, the paper covers the usage of tokenized assets and the potential effects of smart contract services on existing financial service providers. The paper suggests several best practices and requirements for token issuance, including a token registry, standards for backed or asset-linked tokens, and a failsafe reconciliation process if the blockchain fails.

What motivates some firms to hire star academics? This paper provides a theoretical framework that combines several factors known to influence a firm's hiring decision of scientists capable of conducting both, research and development activities. The targeted type, reflecting the scientist's academic ability, is endogenous. When research and development activities are not strong substitutes, the optimal contract induces the scientist to engage in multitasking and the firm targets applicants with either the highest or the lowest type. Scientist with the lowest ability to conduct academic research are hired in environments where investments in absorptive capacity have low returns, academic publications generate substantial negative externalities for the firm, and/or the academic sector offers desirable outside options. When academic ability is not verifiable, the contract must only appeal to scientists with the targeted ability. Top scientists may need to be overcompensated for their research outcomes while low ability scientists may be overly compensated for their development outcomes. This, in turn, leads the hiring decision to be biased in favour of high-ability scientists when research and development activities exhibit a strong complementarity. By opposition, scientists with the lowest ability are more frequently targeted when the cost of conducting both activities increases.