Venture capitalists (VCs) make only a small number of investments and are more likely to invest in ventures where other VCs have invested previously. As such, valuable opportunities may be forgone if they are not funded by VCs in the first place. We demonstrate how crowdfunding (CF) can remedy this concern. Using a sample of new technology-based ventures, we reveal that ventures initially funded through reward-based CF can be even more likely than those initially backed by VCs in attracting follow-up funds from VCs. This happens when ventures originally funded via reward-based CF complement the certification they derive from CF with patents and a founding team with a track record of success. In those cases, VCs rely on the crowd more than their peers. Overall, the results suggest that signal complementarity can at least equalize the effectiveness of an a priori inferior and an a priori superior signal.

Corporate venture capital (CVC) investments can shape industry dynamics in different ways. On one hand, they provide financial resources, expertise, and credibility that help new ventures survive and grow, thereby fostering competition. On the other hand, incumbents can use CVC to absorb knowledge and capabilities from entrepreneurial ventures, strengthening CVC investors' market positions and limiting rivalry. Given these opposing forces, it remains an open question whether higher levels of CVC investments raise or lower industry concentration. This paper advances the literature by uncovering three mechanisms underscoring the impact of within-industry CVC investments (i.e., those with both investors and investees operating in the same industry) on industry concentration and conducting an empirical analysis across U.S. industries from 2001 to 2019. Results show that greater salience of within-industry CVC investments leads to higher industry concentration. The findings carry important implications for entrepreneurial ventures, incumbents, and policymakers.