This paper uses the Dialectic Issue LifeCycle-model (DILC-model) to analyze the co-evolution of the climate change problem and strategic responses from the American car industry. The longitudinal and multi-dimensional analysis investigates the dynamics of the climate change problem in terms of socio-political mobilization by social movements, scientists, wider publics and policymakers. It also analyses how U.S. automakers responded to mounting pressures with socio-political, economic and innovation strategies oriented towards low-carbon propulsion technologies. We use a mixed methodology with a quantitative analysis of various time-series and an in-depth qualitative case study, which traces interactions between problem-related pressures and industry responses. We conclude that U.S. automakers are slowly reorienting towards low-carbon technologies, but due to weakening pressures have not yet fully committed to comprehensive development and marketing. The paper not only applies the DILC-model, but also proposes three elaborations: (a) the continued diversity of technical solutions, and ‘ups and downs’ in future expectations, creates uncertainty which delays strategic reorientation; (b) firms may develop radical innovations for political and social purposes in early phases of the model; (c) issue lifecycles are also shaped by external influences from other problems and contexts.

Addressing societal problems requires the reorientation of firms-in-industries, including changes in technology, belief systems, and mission. The paper aims to make two contributions to the Dialectic Issue LifeCycle (DILC) model, which captures the dynamics of socio-political mobilization around societal problems and industry responses. First, the five phases in the DILC-model are elaborated with insights from social movement theory, political science, public attention, issue management, corporate political strategy, and innovation management. Second, a ‘cyclical’ lifecycle pattern is explored, in which a social problem does not linearly progress through successive phases, but can also move ‘backwards’ if public attention or political will decrease. We explore these contributions with a longitudinal study of the car-safety problem and responses from American automakers (1900–1995). We use a combined quantitative–qualitative method that employs coupled time-series analyses as support for an in-depth case study. The case study showed that the industry long denied the influence of car design on fatalities, and reluctantly changed its position in the mid-1960s (under pressure from public opinion and policymakers). In the late-1980s, when markets emerged because safety became part of consumer preferences, the industry implemented comprehensive changes in technology, beliefs and mission.