A primary argument against fair value measurement is the lack of verifiability, where verifiability is defined as consensus in measurement by independent parties. We evaluate this argument by investigating trends in the consensus of reported fair values. Our findings indicate that consensus increased between 2005 and 2019, as evidenced by reductions in the fair value range and standard deviation. Further analyses suggest that enhanced data availability—driven by public dissemination of trade information—serves as a mechanism for this trend. We also document that securities subject to testing by larger external auditors with more resources to take advantage of enhanced data availability are associated with a stronger trend in increasing consensus. Finally, this trend appears to be stronger in situations when management has a heightened opportunity to record a biased estimate. While conventional arguments express concern over management’s ability to manipulate fair values, our results demonstrate patterns consistent with improved verifiability.

The PCAOB adopted critical audit matters (CAMs) to meet public demand for informative audit disclosure, but stakeholders are concerned this goal has not been achieved. We explore this disconnect via interviews with 30 highly experienced auditors. We find that audit firms expended considerable resources to implement CAM best practices. However, overwhelming institutional pressure gave rise to informal rules of thumb that prioritize symbolic comfort over substantive change. The first is don’t be an outlier , so auditors defer to the national office to ensure conformity and avoid PCAOB scrutiny. The second is report the “right” number of CAMs by never reporting zero and reporting at least one recurring CAM. The third is avoid surprises by communicating with the client to ensure that CAMs do not contain original information and allowing management to preempt auditor disclosures. Collectively, these rules yield CAMs that comply with PCAOB standards but do not provide new information and instead maintain the status quo.

Classical models of voluntary disclosure feature two economic forces: the existence of an adverse selection problem (e.g., a manager possesses some private information) and the cost of ameliorating the problem (e.g., costs associated with disclosure). Traditionally these forces are modelled independently. In this paper, we use a simple model to motivate empirical predictions in a setting where these forces are jointly determined––where greater adverse selection entails greater costs of disclosure. We show that joint determination of these forces generates a pronounced non-linearity in the probability of voluntary disclosure. We find that this non-linearity is empirically descriptive of multiple measures of voluntary disclosure in two distinct empirical settings that are commonly thought to feature both private information and proprietary costs: capital investments and sales to major customers.

Our analysis of how banks’ responses to asset price changes can result in procyclical leverage reveals that, for banks with a binding regulatory leverage constraint, absent differences in regulatory risk weights across assets, procyclical leverage does not occur. For banks without a binding constraint, fair value and bank regulation both can contribute to procyclical leverage. Empirical findings based on a large sample of U.S. commercial banks reveal that bank regulation explains procyclical leverage for banks relatively close to the regulatory leverage constraint and contributes to procyclical leverage for those that are not. We also show that fair value accounting does not contribute to procyclical leverage.

This study explores the association between firm innovation and loan covenant strictness. We find that lenders construct stricter contracts for firms filing more patents, consistent with lenders imposing more oversight on firms when they enter the commercialization stage after having demonstrated their inventiveness. Our results hold under propensity score matching and entropy balancing, and when exploiting the American Inventors Protection Act as a shock affecting unrelated banks’ access to patent filing information. The relationship we document is stronger when the lender has more expertise and for firms with higher default risk. We demonstrate that borrowers’ patent filings are associated with more future R&D and capital investment and with a higher likelihood of their acquiring firms in the industry of their patent filings. Our results are consistent with the theoretical prediction that lenders interpret patent filings as indicative of high inventive potential that requires stricter discipline and oversight by lenders in order to be converted into actual business success, and with them designing debt contract terms accordingly.

We examine firm disclosure choice when information is received on a real-time, continuous basis. We use transaction-level credit and debit card sales for a sample of retail firms to construct a weekly measure of abnormal revenue for each firm. We validate the informativeness of this abnormal real-time revenue information, confirming its positive correlation with abnormal returns, unexpected revenue realizations, and management revenue forecast news. Using revenue forecasts, we find that firms are less likely to disclose abnormally negative news early in the quarter. As the quarter progresses, firms reduce their withholding of negative news. These results are consistent with impending earnings announcements disciplining managers to provide negative news. This pattern of initial withholding and then disclosure exists primarily in firms with high analyst coverage, high institutional ownership, or high litigation risk. Finally, we find increased insider stock sales in weeks with abnormally negative news and no firm disclosure. Overall, our study provides evidence of the informativeness of real-time information and manager discretion in its release.