We examine how removing user anonymity affects social media’s ability to generate value-relevant information for the stock market. Using a difference-in-differences design that exploits the differential timing of adopting real-name verification policies by the two most popular investment-related social media websites in China, we find that content on the treated site becomes significantly more informative about future stock returns and earnings after the policy takes effect. This effect is primarily driven by continuing users who post more actively in the pre-period. Although these users post less after the policy, the informational content of their posts increases, suggesting greater prudence in expressing opinions. Our results strengthen for firms that attract regulatory scrutiny. Overall, our study suggests that real-name verification policies can discipline internet users and potentially improve the informativeness of investment-related social media, particularly in emerging markets where retail investors predominate.

We survey public company executives and directors to understand what audit clients want from their auditor in today’s regulated environment. Our results provide at least three important takeaways. First, executives and directors view elements of auditors’ service quality (e.g., timeliness of communications) as at least as important as auditors’ technical competence. Second, we find no evidence that stakeholders’ preferences for service quality replaces their expectation for technical competence. Third, we find that 57% of executives and 67% of directors feel they can very accurately assess audit quality after an audit’s completion, but we are unable to identify clear determinants of participants’ self-reported ability to assess quality. Our results highlight the challenges facing auditors as they attempt to please clients, protect shareholders, and comply with regulations, all while offering a product whose quality is inherently challenging for others to assess. Our findings motivate future research and inform regulatory efforts.

We document that firms vary in their timeliness of support for the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement following the death of George Floyd in May 2020, and that timeliness is an indicator of authenticity. We predict that firms that speak out quickly in support of BLM (via Twitter or their websites) have made more investments in diversity and inclusion, relative to firms that speak out slowly (via conference calls or annual reports) or that remain silent. Consistent with this prediction, quick -disclosing firms have greater workforce diversity, have boards with greater ethnic diversity, and are more likely to tie executive compensation to diversity and inclusivity. Furthermore, quick -disclosing firms increase their hiring of both Black American employees and Black directors relative to firms that stay silent. We also document that quick-disclosing firms are part of more supportive stakeholder networks. We develop an inclusivity index and show that firms with higher index levels are more likely to speak out on the Capitol Riots, the Asian Spa Shootings, and voting rights.

Against the backdrop of an increasing threat of misinformation on social media, several countries have enacted regulations to curb the spread of misinformation. This study examines how corporate social media strategy responds to misinformation regulations. Using a large cross-country dataset of corporate tweets and a stacked regression analysis, we show that misinformation regulations lead to less corporate social media disclosure. This result suggests that, by deterring misinformation, these regulations reduce firms’ need to use social media to counteract its adverse effects. Additional analyses show that the effect strengthens among countries with higher social media usage and those with stronger investor protection but weakens for firms with stronger information environments. Finally, we provide direct evidence that firms post fewer tweets refuting misinformation about themselves following the enactment of these regulations.

Research suggests that board members value financial reporting quality because executive dismissal often follows low reporting quality events. However, inferences about the board’s demand for reporting quality in these studies are confounded by board members’ reputation incentives because the events examined are public (e.g., restatements). We investigate boards’ demand for reporting quality by exploiting a private signal of misreporting: audit adjustments communicated to the Board by the external auditor. We first survey 29 audit committee chairs to understand whether boards use audit adjustments in their oversight of management and then conduct an empirical investigation to answer our research question. We find an increased likelihood of CFO dismissal following audit adjustments. This association is driven by adjustments that reduce income and by firms with better board oversight. These findings suggest that boards proactively use nonpublic signals of reporting quality and incorporate information from auditors into their monitoring function.