Knowledge that Transforms

Despite decades of research on how, why, and when companies manage earnings, there is a paucity of evidence about the geographic location of earnings management within multinational firms. In this study, we examine where companies manage earnings using a sample of 2,067 U.S. multinational firms from 1994 to 2009. We predict and find that firms with extensive foreign operations in weak rule of law countries have more foreign earnings management than companies with subsidiaries in locations where the rule of law is strong. We also find some evidence that profitable firms with extensive tax haven subsidiaries manage earnings more than other firms and that the earnings management is concentrated in foreign income. Apart from these results, we find that most earnings management takes place in domestic income, not foreign income.

We provide large sample evidence that credible hedge commitments reduce the agency costs of debt and that accounting conservatism enhances hedge commitments. We examine 2,338 bank loans entered into by 263 mandatory derivative users that are contractually obligated by interest rate protection covenants, 709 voluntary derivative users, and 1,366 non-users. We show that loan contracts are more likely to include interest rate protection covenants when borrowers are less likely to maintain the hedge position once the financing is completed. We find that borrowers who credibly commit to hedge using these covenants significantly reduce their interest rates. While we do not find an average interest savings for voluntary derivative users, we do find a reduction in their loan rates when they practice conservative financial reporting. Our results suggest that accounting conservatism helps borrowers resolve shareholder-creditor conflicts by committing to maintain their hedge positions after completing debt financing.

This paper examines the effect of Sarbanes-Oxley provisions on 10-K filing delays. We find that tightened filing deadlines for accelerated and large accelerated filers are not associated with changes in the incidence of late filing. While Section 404 compliance does not affect filing timeliness for firms with effective internal controls, we find that about half the firms disclosing internal control weaknesses are late filers. As a consequence, many Section 404 material weakness firms experience negative abnormal returns around late filing notifications before filing the 10-K. Lastly, we find that market reactions to late filing notifications are more negative when management provides no meaningful explanation for the delay, consistent with managers’ incentives to withhold bad news.