Knowledge that Transforms

Current corporate disclosures regarding carbon emissions lack generally accepted accounting rules. The transactional carbon accounting system described here takes the rules of historical cost accounting for operating assets as a template for generating carbon emissions (CE) statements comprising a balance sheet and a flow statement. The asset side of the CE balance sheet reports the carbon emissions embodied in operating assets. The liability side conveys the firm’s cumulative direct emissions into the atmosphere as well as the cumulative emissions embodied in goods acquired from suppliers less those sold to customers. Flow statements report the company’s annual corporate carbon footprint calculated as the cradle-to-gate carbon footprint of goods sold during the current period. Taken together, balance sheets and flow statements generate key performance indicators of a company’s past, current, and future performance in the domain of carbon emissions.

This study compares and contrasts US and international accounting and financial reporting practices for cryptocurrency. We analyze the financial statements of 40 global companies that have exposure to cryptocurrencies, including cryptocurrency purchases, mining, payments, trading, and investments in ICOs and early-stage blockchain ventures. We document inconsistency between Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), as well as distortions that can mislead users in assessing asset value, liquidity, profitability, and cash-generating abilities across firms. In particular, firms receiving cryptocurrencies in revenue-generating activities account for cryptocurrencies as intangibles using different measurement bases and classify the associated cash inflows differently. Some firms place cryptocurrencies in the usual long-term location of intangibles, while others consider intangibles as liquid, short-term assets. Limited guidance about crypto-assets from both IFRS and GAAP lets companies choose which existing standard to apply and how to apply it. Understanding the financial and valuation implications of these new virtual assets is vital for future accounting research and professional practice.

From 2008 to 2020, 180 of S&P 1500 have disclosed employee diversity targets. We conduct the first analysis of firms’ employee diversity targets and ask three research questions: (i) who announces diversity targets? (ii) do firms deliver on their diversity targets? (iii) what are the implications of disclosure of such targets for employee hiring and investors? We find that firms with a greater willingness (proxied by past ESG penalties, higher CEO-to-median employee pay ratio, more media coverage, and after #MeToo and Black Lives Matter movements) and ability (proxied by financial strength, a blue-collar heavy labor force, and gender and ethnic minorities on boards) to improve employee diversity are more likely to disclose diversity targets. Exploiting the Revelio dataset of 15,639 firm-years for 1,203 distinct firms from 2008 to 2020, we observe that firms that disclosed a diversity target have indeed hired more diverse employees, but such diversity levels had already increased substantially prior to the target disclosure. Firms with numerical, forward-looking, and rank-and-file employee-targeted goals are associated with greater employee diversity relative to firms that announce other types of diversity goals. Moreover, improved diversity performance does not appear to occur at the cost of employee quality, as measured by Revelio. Overall our results have practical implications for how investors and stakeholders might want to interpret corporate diversity targets.

This paper studies how public information regarding a firm’s riskiness affects investors’ incentives to acquire information about the firm and the firm’s ability to learn decision-useful information from its price. I find that risk information complements investor learning by informing investors of when it is most lucrative to investigate the firm, thereby reducing liquidity. Furthermore, risk information causes the firm’s price to contain more information when the firm’s investment decisions have the greatest impact on its value, thereby improving real efficiency. Extensions of the model suggest that the impact of risk information on real efficiency may deteriorate when the firm’s manager is excessively exposed to idiosyncratic risk, when the firm’s shareholders are excessively averse to such risk, or when the disclosure concerns a “downside risk.” In sum, my analysis suggests that information regarding firms’ expected values and information regarding firms’ risks significantly differ in their effects on the capital market.