Knowledge that Transforms

We develop a rating system to evaluate the quality of individual non-GAAP exclusions. Our perspective is that high-quality exclusions reflect nonrecurring economic transactions, are transitory accounting adjustments, or have little usefulness in forecasting cash flows. We use four approaches to rate exclusions. We evaluate the serial correlation of the exclusion, survey accounting academics’ views, obtain practitioner ratings from the CFA Institute, and identify the exclusions approved by the Chinese securities regulator. A firm’s exclusion quality score is the weighted average rating of its individual exclusions. For our sample of S&P 500 firms, we document that exclusion quality varies by industry, captures trends in non-GAAP reporting, and is reasonably stable at the firm level. To validate the rating, we show that firms with lower exclusion quality scores receive more SEC comment letters, incur more Regulation G violations, exhibit greater analyst forecast dispersion, and have slower price discovery following earnings announcements.

Early empirical evidence showed a lack of relative performance evaluation (RPE) for executive pay, a surprise given its theoretical appeal. We hypothesize that executive pay transparency can enhance the monitoring of pay practices and increase RPE use. We examine RPE over the two decades centered on the 2006 executive pay disclosure reforms in the United States, which stakeholders—including shareholders, proxy advisors, and compensation consultants—could use to monitor pay plans. Firms that increase disclosures exhibit a significant increase in RPE after the reforms. To understand why, we examine and document that (i) stakeholder attention to pay practices increases after the reform, (ii) stakeholder attention positively relates to increases in RPE, and (iii) say-on-pay voting confirms shareholders’ preference for RPE. Overall, our findings are consistent with executive pay transparency increasing RPE due to enhanced pay monitoring across stakeholders.

We examine whether mutual fund managers overestimate carbon risk when they are exposed to local air pollution. We find that air pollution near fund managers induces them to underweight stocks of high-emission firms. The effects strengthen among environmentally conscious fund managers and among those likely to be surprised by air pollution—consistent with the idea that managers revise their beliefs about carbon risk following exposure to air pollution. A firm’s carbon-emissions disclosures and fund managers’ sophistication moderate these effects. Carbon-intensive stocks sold by fund managers who are exposed to local air pollution subsequently outperform stocks they buy, suggesting that such underweighting is costly to fund investors.

This study examines whether auditor KAM disclosures about M&A transactions predict future performance outcomes. We find that auditors make more M&A KAM disclosures when M&A transactions are larger, involve targets with greater information asymmetry, and are subject to greater overpayment risk. When auditors disclose M&A KAMs in the acquisition year, we find an increased risk of larger goodwill impairments and that the association between acquired goodwill and changes in companies’ subsequent operating performance are significantly lower compared to when auditors do not issue an M&A KAM. We also find that the likelihood of forced CEO turnover is incrementally higher when subsequent operating performance is poor and auditors issue an M&A KAM compared to when they do not. Collectively, our findings suggest that these auditor disclosures reflect uncertainty that predicts weak post-acquisition performance and forced CEO turnover, incremental to other indicators of failed acquisition strategies.

We estimate investors’ disagreement regarding firm news and assess its ability to predict stock returns. Specifically, we quantify firm-level investor disagreement through the volume-volatility elasticity surrounding firm news; higher elasticity is associated with less investor disagreement. Intuitively, disagreement introduces additional trading motives that are not driven by price changes, weakening the connection between volume and volatility. Our findings indicate that investor disagreement on news negatively predicts cross-sectional returns. We also present empirical evidence aligned with the theoretical predictions of a recently developed model by Atmaz and Basak (Journal of Finance 73 (3): 1225–1279 2018) that the negative disagreement-stock relation strengthens when the optimism effect dominates the uncertainty effect. Importantly, this predictive relationship remains robust after controlling for news heterogeneity, other volume- and volatility-based measures, and alternative channels.

We study how global changes in information acquisition costs through disclosure technologies affect price informativeness. To explore this issue, we examine worldwide adoptions of centralized electronic disclosure systems, which significantly reduce the cost of and broaden access to financial disclosures. Consistent with theory, we show a significant reduction in private information acquisition around earnings announcements as a result of these adoptions. These effects are most pronounced in countries with the most substantial reductions in information acquisition costs and where we find more significant decreases in informed trade. Overall, we highlight an important, unintended cost of broadening access to financial disclosures through technology adoptions.

We study the role of CFO narcissism in the intent and ability to positively influence sell-side analysts’ perceptions of the firm. Consistent with narcissists casting favorable impressions on others, we find CFO narcissism is associated with overly optimistic analyst valuations. We then study public persuasion attempts by analyzing conference call transcripts and private persuasion attempts through a laboratory study. In the conference call setting, we show that narcissistic CFOs use more persuasive language and are more inclined to call on bearish analysts, both of which we link to price target revisions following the call. In the lab study, we simulate a one-on-one conversation and find that narcissists are especially more likely to use coercive methods to induce higher valuations from analysts. Collectively, we show that narcissistic CFOs use persuasion to favorably influence analysts’ perceptions of firm value.

We provide a comprehensive overview of accounting-related regulatory changes (financial accounting, auditing, tax, and other disclosures) in the 27 European Union countries and the United Kingdom since 1993 based on an extensive literature review, survey, and topic and country expert input. Across all countries and years, we find that more than 16 regulatory events occur in a typical difference-in-differences research design that includes pre- and post-periods of four years. On average 3.4 out of four accounting disciplines are affected, emphasizing the need for interdisciplinary awareness. Our accompanying website ( http://www.eu-regulations.com ) offers visual representations of these events, regulation summaries, literature links, and source documents, all by country. This work aims to (1) lower the cost for researchers, reviewers, and editors to understand the EU’s evolving regulatory landscape; (2) improve research designs by identifying concurrent regulatory events; and (3) highlight research opportunities for those studying the EU or specific member states.

This study examines the consequences of tax key audit matters (KAMs) to the valuation of tax attributes and to auditor-provided tax services (APTS). The literature finds that KAM adoption is not associated with investor or audit outcomes, creating an impetus to identify whether specific KAM topics are more consequential. Tax KAMs are an ideal setting because they are prevalent, taxes are economically important, and auditors can provide tax services to their clients. We find that investors discount the tax avoidance and deferred tax assets of tax-KAM companies, suggesting an incentive for managers to avoid tax KAMs. Consistent with self-interest threats to auditor independence, we find that receiving a tax KAM is negatively associated with clients’ concurrent purchases of APTS, but that clients increase their future purchases of these services when they stop receiving tax KAMs. These results reveal novel consequences of tax KAMs to the valuation of companies’ tax attributes and to APTS incentives.