Knowledge that Transforms

This paper investigates the effects of a regulatory change in China of the presentation format for research and development (R&D) expense, which mandates public firms to explicitly present R&D expense on their income statements. We predict that this regulation will impact nonstate-owned enterprises (non-SOEs), which care about stock market valuation, more than state-owned enterprises (SOEs). We find that non-SOEs report significantly higher R&D expense post regulation. Furthermore, the R&D increase strengthens for firms facing higher peer pressure to pursue R&D and high-tech firms and weakens for firms with higher institutional investment. The positive valuation implication of R&D diminishes post regulation, suggesting that investors discount the increase in R&D expense. An additional analysis shows that firms’ innovation efficiency decreases post regulation.

We investigate whether firms that proclaim a commitment to corporate social responsibility (CSR) by CSR reporting indeed internalize such a commitment and behave more responsibly. We analyze the association of the issuance and quality of voluntary CSR reports with the occurrence, number, and severity of corporate misbehaviors, both preceding and subsequent to CSR reporting. We find a significantly positive association of CSR reporting with our measures of prior and future misbehavior. The results are corroborated by a quasi-natural experiment around the Rana Plaza disaster where we find that the signatories of an accord for better working conditions have significantly higher prior and future misbehavior relative to non-signatories and firms unaffected by the exogenous shock. Our results are in line with legitimacy theory implying that, on average, the firms’ proclaiming commitment to CSR is not a signal of internalized commitment but more likely serves greenwashing and impression management purposes.

We provide an economics-based review of the pros and cons of ESG disclosures, emphasizing environmental disclosures from an investor-centric perspective. Our survey intends to guide corporate management and regulators in navigating the ESG disclosure terrain. Rather than summarizing the vast and growing ESG literature, we assess the economic arguments for ESG disclosure regulation and the form of this disclosure. We discuss investors’ demand for ESG information and its supply by publicly traded firms. We analyze the case for and against mandatory ESG disclosure. Finally, we weigh the efficiency of disclosure requirement characteristics, assuming mandatory ESG disclosure is warranted. We intend to be positive rather than prescriptive, providing a line of reasoning readers can employ to reach their own conclusions about what we ought to do.

We examine the association between CEO birthplace proximity and financial misconduct. We find that CEOs managing firms near their birthplaces (home CEOs) are associated with less financial misconduct compared to other CEOs. This association is not attributable to differences in corporate governance. The relationship strengthens in areas with a strong local investment presence and greater religious commitment as well as among CEOs with longer tenures in their home state. Our findings are robust to addressing potential selection and omitted variable biases as well as to conducting multiple robustness tests, including analyses of involuntary CEO changes and headquarters relocations. We also find a similar association for CFOs, with firms employing home CFOs exhibiting less financial misconduct.

This study examines how government procurement impacts firms’ environmental disclosures and whether they have tangible effects. Using a triple-difference research design that exploits the exogenous increase in federal funding allocations to counties based on population census revisions, we find that firms with high exposure to government contracts significantly increase climate disclosure following expanded procurement opportunities. We also document that enhanced disclosure is characterized by a positive tone that emphasizes firms’ green investment and commitment to climate adaptation. The effect is more pronounced in counties with a greater increase in procurement volume and when firms have lower ex ante sustainability performance. Finally, we find firms that increase climate disclosure are more likely to earn government contracts, and they undertake real actions by reducing toxic emissions and enhancing the development of green products. Overall our results suggest government procurement promotes corporate climate responsibility by incentivizing firms to undertake climate mitigation actions.

We provide the first large-sample evidence on third-party verification of firms’ environmental and social metrics in ESG reports (ESG assurance) in the United States. Focusing on the S&P 500 from 2010–2020, we document a striking increase in not only the number of firms with ESG assurance—in 2020 (2010), 76% (38%) of the S&P 500 had an ESG report and 46% (16%) involved assurance—but also the number of metrics assured. Unlike financial audits, ESG assurance varies widely in form and substance, including the choice of metrics assured, the level of assurance, and assuror identity. We show that firms’ decision to obtain ESG assurance is primarily driven by their adoption of ESG reporting frameworks and peer effects, with firm characteristics documented in prior literature playing only a minor role. Assurance is associated with improvements in ESG disclosure, ESG ratings, and the number of institutional investors holding the firm’s stock.

This paper studies the grouping of firms based on their labor-market connections, a significant departure from the traditional approach of grouping based on product-market connections. It also proposes a measure of labor market peers by analyzing the “also viewed” companies on two major online labor market platforms, LinkedIn and Glassdoor. Using the labor market peer measure, I examine whether firms that hire employees with similar skills and that are presumably exposed to the same labor-related risks and shocks exhibit a strong comovement of stock returns and accounting-based performance variables. I find that labor market peers overlap but differ from traditional product-market-based industry groupings, have significant incremental power to explain stock return and accounting-based performance measure comovements, and outperform traditional industry groupings in explaining return and wage comovements when a base firm shares more labor skills with its peers. Overall, the study highlights that labor market peers capture fundamental linkages between firms that are challenging to identify using traditional industry measures.

We examine the role of private equity in alleviating earnings myopia induced by public markets. We first construct a measure of earnings myopia and show that this measure varies as predicted with determinants and effects of myopia. Then we show that public firms exhibiting earnings myopia realize an increased likelihood of takeover by private equity buyers. Cross-sectional analyses indicate that this relation is strongest when costs of earnings myopia are likely higher. Following private equity takeovers, firms exhibiting greater measures of earnings myopia realize improvements to R&D investment and productivity. The results add to the understanding of the role of private equity in identifying and alleviating earnings myopia within U.S. capital markets. This is important given the increasing size of private equity assets under management. Takeover premiums paid for myopic firms suggest a cost of earnings myopia at approximately 6.9% of firm value.

This paper identifies a helpful red flag stakeholders can use to detect whether a nonprofit has managed its financial information. This red flag is reporting an identical program ratio—that is, the nonprofit organization reports the exact same ratio in multiple years—while reporting a large change in total spending. We find nonprofits are more likely to report identical program ratios when resource providers rely on ratios; pay is determined, at least in part, by performance; and the potential for regulatory interference is high. This paper also identifies the cost allocation techniques and the specific expenses nonprofits likely manage. We find most nonprofits alter the allocations of multiple expenses and find the specific expenses most likely manipulated are ones where managers have a high degree of discretion over how much to allocate to programs.