Knowledge that Transforms

Managers are required to disclose material climate risk in Form 10-K, but their decision whether or not to disclose is confounded by the lack of consensus on whether climate risk is material to the firms, as well as uncertainty about enforcement of disclosure regulations. Using the SASB Materiality Map™ to proxy for market expectations of climate risk materiality, we test whether the association between disclosing climate risk in 10-Ks and firm risk (proxied by cost of equity (COE)) varies with market expectations of climate risk materiality. Using S&P 500 firms’ decisions whether to disclose climate risk in Form 10-K for 2008 to 2016, we find that disclosing firms’ COE is 27 bps lower than nondisclosing firms’ COE. In industries where the market expects climate risk to be material, disclosing firms’ COE is 50 bps lower than nondisclosing firms’, while in industries where the market does not expect climate risk to be material, disclosing firms’ COE is 23 bps lower than nondisclosing firms’. Our results indicate that markets use expectations of climate risk materiality to infer the credibility of managers’ climate risk disclosure decisions. Our research contributes to policy-making on climate risk disclosures in regulatory filings and informs the debate around the costs and benefits of the SEC’s current proposal to enhance climate risk disclosures.

The funding policy for defined benefit pension plans covering government employees represents an important decision for governments sponsoring those plans. Many state and local government plans have become severely underfunded (e.g., New Jersey, Illinois, and Detroit), raising concerns about whether governments are contributing enough to their pensions. Governmental Accounting Standards Board Statements 67/68 (GASB 67/68) fundamentally alter the financial reporting of pension liabilities, by (i) requiring pension liabilities to be estimated using a potentially lower discount rate (increasing estimated liabilities and any funding deficits), and (ii) mandating balance sheet recognition of funding deficits/surpluses. Although GASB 67/68 only change financial reporting and acknowledge specifically that funding is outside their scope, we find, for 100 large state-administered plans, that governments increase pension contributions significantly upon applying GASB 67/68. This funding response is stronger from governments likely to face greater political consequences once pension deficits are made prominent by GASB 67/68. Benefit cuts are also more likely post GASB 67/68, but plans that increase funding are less likely to cut benefits—suggesting that these responses substitute for each other and that pension funding is more of a fiscal priority in some states than others. Overall, our findings suggest that purely accounting changes can have “real” effects on governmental pension policy.

Decentralized finance (DeFi) has emerged to offer traditional financial services such as lending, borrowing, and trading without intermediaries (e.g., banks). DeFi transactions are typically executed using a special digital class of contracts called smart contracts. These contracts are self-executing and hard-coded directly on a blockchain. We observe the emergence of a new class of voluntary audits that evaluate the integrity of these contracts. Using a hand-coded sample of about 8,500 smart contract audit reports, we provide some of the first evidence showing that (1) these audits are pervasive, (2) the audit firm market is composed of new technical audit firms, (3) the scope of these audits can span a variety of contract features, (4) the audit inputs and outputs differ substantively from those of conventional financial audits, and (5) the market reacts positively to the release of these audit reports, suggesting that these reports are value-relevant. These findings highlight the demand for novel assurance services driven by blockchain technology.

Merkley et al. (2023) examine how cryptocurrency influencers recommend digital coins on Twitter (X) and the associated price effects. They report that influencers may exploit market investors via potential pump and dump schemes. While plausible, researchers may develop a broader understanding of influencers’ incentives and their influence by considering how investors engage these markets for social identity needs that enhance utility. Social-psychological research indicates that someone’s social identity strongly influences their behavior, even making the behavior maladaptive. This paper discusses how crypto influencers create social identity resonance. It then discusses how influencers can leverage this resonance for potentially lucrative financial opportunities, which might manifest in different expected crypto price patterns. The paper concludes by recommending more research on influencers’ experience, networks, and communication choices; the effects of video relative to text communication; and implications of social identity cohorts that influence prices and undermine regulatory trust in traditional markets.

Activist investors in a firm often voluntarily release information about their governance intentions to the public. Voluntary disclosure theory suggests that an activist investor will disclose when she expects other investors to respond positively and support her in upcoming corporate control contests. We find that activists’ disclosures are accompanied by positive abnormal returns, reductions in bid-ask spreads, and increases in future earnings relative to similar targets without voluntary activist disclosures. Disclosures by activists who demand a board seat (the most common demand) have the highest announcement returns, and disclosers also win proxy contests and directorships more frequently than non-disclosers. These findings suggest that the activist’s beliefs about investor response in both pricing and voting are an important driver of her disclosure choice.

ChatGPT frequently appears in the media, with many predicting significant disruptions, especially in the fields of accounting and auditing. Yet research has demonstrated relatively poor performance of ChatGPT on student assessment questions. We extend this research to examine whether more recent ChatGPT models and capabilities can pass major accounting certification exams including the Certified Public Accountant (CPA), Certified Management Accountant (CMA), Certified Internal Auditor (CIA), and Enrolled Agent (EA) certification exams. We find that the ChatGPT 3.5 model cannot pass any exam (average score across all assessments of 53.1%). However, with additional enhancements, ChatGPT can pass all sections of each tested exam: moving to the ChatGPT 4 model improved scores by an average of 16.5%, providing 10-shot training improved scores an additional 6.6%, and allowing the model to use reasoning and acting (e.g., allow ChatGPT to use a calculator and other resources) improved scores an additional 8.9%. After all these improvements, ChatGPT passed all exams with an average score of 85.1%. This high performance indicates that ChatGPT has sufficient capabilities to disrupt the accounting and auditing industries, which we discuss in detail. This research provides practical insights for accounting professionals, investors, and stakeholders on how to adapt and mitigate the potential harms of this technology in accounting and auditing firms.