We examine the impact of auditors’ reputation impairments on their private-client market share to explore how conducting low-quality audits affects auditors’ broader client portfolios. Prior evidence implies that an audit office loses public-client market share after a client announces a restatement. However, auditors’ private clients may be less concerned about auditor reputation and quality, given that they have lower agency costs and their financial statement users are often creditors that can rely on direct monitoring to narrow information asymmetry. Also, differences between public and private company audits cast doubt on whether public-client restatements are relevant to private clients. We find that the private-client market share of a Big Four audit office falls by, on average, 5 percent the year after a public client announces a restatement. This evidence suggests that Big Four offices cannot simply replace lost public-client revenue with private-client revenue after suffering reputation damage.

We examine whether broad-based public engagement by institutional investors influences the behavior of portfolio firms. We investigate this question in the context of BlackRock’s annual Dear CEO letter, which in recent years has called for portfolio firms to acknowledge and quantify the impact of environmental and regulatory factors on their firms. We find that portfolio firms’ disclosures during the post-letter period reflect topics similar to those discussed in the letters, controlling for a variety of firm and disclosure characteristics and the occurrence of private engagements. Moreover, BlackRock appears to value these additional disclosures, as it more often votes with management on shareholder proposals during subsequent annual shareholder meetings. Finally, motivated by BlackRock’s attempts to mobilize firms toward its specific policy recommendations, we also provide some evidence that firms’ lobbying efforts during the post-letter period become more aligned with the issues highlighted in the letter, especially when firms’ share BlackRock’s policy preferences ex ante. Taken together, our evidence suggests that portfolio firms are responsive to BlackRock’s public engagement efforts.

We identify a pecuniary externality arising from corporate tax avoidance. Firms share risk with the government via taxation. The lower the tax rate applied to a firm’s earnings, the more risk its shareholders bear. As more firms avoid taxes, the variance of the market’s after-tax cash flow increases. Consequently, the covariance of a firm’s cash flow with the market cash flow and thereby its cost of capital increases. This occurs regardless of a firm’s tax avoidance. Consistent with our prediction, we find that firms’ implied cost of capital relates positively to aggregate corporate tax avoidance regardless of a firm’s level of tax avoidance. As we predict, the pecuniary externality is stronger for firms whose cash flow covaries more with the market cash flow and is driven by tax avoidance strategies that reduce a firm’s marginal tax rate (e.g., income shifting of U.S. multinationals) as opposed to reducing its tax base.