Knowledge that Transforms

We examine whether dividends serve as substitutes or complements to accounting information in firm valuation. Consistent with dividends substituting for earnings information, we find that dividend paying firms have 11%–15% lower earnings response coefficients (ERCs) than non-payers. We find more substitution when the dividend provides a stronger signal of permanent earnings: when the firm is less likely to cut the dividend, when the firm is likely to fund the dividend out of earnings rather than cash reserves, or when the dividend is larger. We then show that dividend payers have lower absolute returns, less trading volume, and fewer analyst forecasts at the earnings announcement (EA), suggesting that dividend payers attract less attention to their less informative EAs. Finally, we show that the lower EA attention translates into less earnings management and fewer earnings-related disclosures for dividend payers relative to non-payers. Collectively, this evidence suggests that dividends supply information about permanent earnings and, although costly, could be an efficient way for some firms to satisfy investors’ demand for earnings information.

We analyze the extent to which individual audit partners influence the audited narrative disclosures in their clients’ financial reports. Using a sample of 3,281,423 private and public client firm-pairs, we find that the similarity among audited narrative disclosures is higher when two client firms share the same audit partner. Specifically, we find that the wording similarity of management reports (notes) increases by 30 (48) percent, the content similarity by 29 (49) percent, and the structure similarity by 48 (121) percent. Moreover, we find that audit partners in particular are relevant for their clients’ narrative disclosures because the increase in narrative disclosure similarity when sharing the same audit partner is nine (four) times greater than when sharing the same audit firm (audit office). We show that this influence of audit partners goes beyond adding boilerplate statements and, using novel field evidence, we shed light on the underlying mechanisms. Our findings are economically relevant because a stronger involvement of audit partners with their clients’ narratives is associated with a higher quality of narrative disclosures, which helps users better predict the future profitability of client firms.

Prior studies on real earnings management (REM) focus mainly on estimating abnormal operating and investing activities at the firm level. We extend this literature by providing micro-level evidence regarding how financial reporting pressures influence new product release decisions, or product-level REM. Specifically, we compare how public and private studios differentially time the release of their movies. We find that, faced with pressure to boost quarterly revenues and earnings, public studios are more likely to release movies with high expected revenues in the last month of a fiscal quarter, compared to private studios. This documented result is stronger for firms with recent poor past performance, but is not present for movies in genres with a more targeted release window (e.g., romance and horror movies) and those using directors who have a history of collaboration with the studio. These results suggest that studios choose REM activities that have a lower impact on consumer demand and that minimize conflict with talent, consistent with choosing less costly activities to achieve financial reporting goals. A negative consequence of this financial reporting–driven product release strategy is that movies released in the last month of a quarter have lower international box office revenues. Taken together, these results provide evidence of the existence and consequences of product-level REM.

Employing the SEC Tick Size Pilot Program, which increases the minimum trading unit of a set of randomly selected small-capitalization stocks, we examine whether and how an exogenous change in stock liquidity affects corporate voluntary disclosure. Using difference-in-differences analyses with firm fixed effects, we find that treatment firms respond to the liquidity decline by issuing fewer management earnings forecasts, while, in contrast, control firms do not exhibit a significant change. Next we show that the effect is more pronounced when firms experience more severe liquidity decreases during the TSPP and rule out a set of alternative explanations. Further strengthening the identification, we find a consistent reversal effect after the end of the pilot program. To generalize our findings, we use voluntary 8-K filings and conference calls as alternative voluntary disclosure proxies and find similar effects. Overall, these findings show how an exogenous change in stock liquidity shapes the corporate information environment.

We study whether firms that are led by chief executive officers (CEOs) with law degrees (lawyer CEOs) have different credit ratings and costs of debt from other firms. Our sample consists of Standard & Poor’s 1500 firms from 1992 to 2020, 9.2% of which have lawyer CEOs. We find that these firms have better credit ratings, compared to other firms. On average, their cost of debt is 10% lower than that of firms led by CEOs without legal backgrounds. Our results are robust to different specifications, sampling methods, and controls, such as firm and CEO characteristics. We identify two ways that CEO expertise translates into higher credit ratings: lawyer CEOs are associated with a lower future volatility of stock returns and a reduction in information risk. The decreased business risk and better financial reporting are associated with 5% lower auditing fees for firms with lawyer CEOs.