We provide an economics-based review of the pros and cons of ESG disclosures, emphasizing environmental disclosures from an investor-centric perspective. Our survey intends to guide corporate management and regulators in navigating the ESG disclosure terrain. Rather than summarizing the vast and growing ESG literature, we assess the economic arguments for ESG disclosure regulation and the form of this disclosure. We discuss investors’ demand for ESG information and its supply by publicly traded firms. We analyze the case for and against mandatory ESG disclosure. Finally, we weigh the efficiency of disclosure requirement characteristics, assuming mandatory ESG disclosure is warranted. We intend to be positive rather than prescriptive, providing a line of reasoning readers can employ to reach their own conclusions about what we ought to do

We provide the first large-sample evidence on third-party verification of firms’ environmental and social metrics in ESG reports (ESG assurance) in the United States. Focusing on the S&P 500 from 2010–2020, we document a striking increase in not only the number of firms with ESG assurance—in 2020 (2010), 76% (38%) of the S&P 500 had an ESG report and 46% (16%) involved assurance—but also the number of metrics assured. Unlike financial audits, ESG assurance varies widely in form and substance, including the choice of metrics assured, the level of assurance, and assuror identity. We show that firms’ decision to obtain ESG assurance is primarily driven by their adoption of ESG reporting frameworks and peer effects, with firm characteristics documented in prior literature playing only a minor role. Assurance is associated with improvements in ESG disclosure, ESG ratings, and the number of institutional investors holding the firm’s stock

We show that banks with high environmental, social, and governance (ESG) ratings issue fewer mortgages in poor localities—in number and dollar amount—than banks with low ESG ratings. This lending disparity happens at both the county and census tract level, worsens in disaster areas of severe hurricane strikes, is robust to alternative ESG ratings (including using only the social (S) component), and cannot be explained by banks’ differential deposit networks. We find no difference in mortgage default rates between high- and low-ESG banks, rejecting an alternative explanation based on differential credit screening quality. We report a complementary, not substitution, relation between high-ESG banks’ mortgage lending and their community development investments (like affordable housing projects) in poor localities. Loan-application-level analyses confirm that high-ESG banks are more likely than low-ESG banks to reject mortgage loans in poor neighborhoods. The evidence hints at social wash: banks deploy prosocial rhetoric and symbolic actions while not lending much in disadvantaged communities, the social function they arguably ought to perform. Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) examinations partially undo the social wash effect

Investment funds that claim to focus on socially responsible stocks have proliferated in recent times. In this paper, we verify whether ESG mutual funds actually invest in firms that have stakeholder-friendly track records. Using a comprehensive sample of self-labelled ESG mutual funds (as identified by Morningstar) in the United States from 2010 to 2018, we find that these funds hold portfolio firms with worse track records for compliance with labor and environmental laws, relative to portfolio firms held by non-ESG funds managed by the same financial institutions in the same years. Relative to other funds offered by the same asset managers in the same years, ESG funds hold stocks that are more likely to voluntarily disclose carbon emissions performance but also stocks with higher carbon emissions per unit of revenue. Despite these findings, ESG funds hold portfolio firms with higher average ESG scores. We show that ESG scores are correlated with the quantity of voluntary ESG-related disclosures but not with firms’ compliance records or actual levels of carbon emissions. Finally, ESG funds appear to underperform financially relative to other funds within the same asset manager and year, and to charge higher fees. Our findings suggest that socially responsible funds do not appear to follow through on proclamations of concerns for stakeholders

Using a novel measure that captures negative ESG incidents at both listed and private suppliers, we provide large-scale evidence on the value implications of supply chain ESG. We find that firms with fewer supply chain ESG incidents exhibit higher future accounting performance and that this effect is stronger in the presence of more conscious customers and vulnerable supply chains. We also find that firms with robust supply chain ESG exhibit higher future stock returns and that this effect is more pronounced when information frictions are higher, which suggests that it takes time for the market to understand the value implications of supply chain ESG. Overall, we highlight the benefits of managing supply chain ESG and the decision usefulness of the related information

We document that U.S. mutual funds with investment objectives designated as “Sustainable Investment Overall” by Morningstar (ESG funds) are more likely than other mutual funds to vote in support of environmental and social (ES) shareholder proposals and governance (G) shareholder proposals. We also find that the higher support for ES proposals by ESG funds relative to other funds is more pronounced in index funds than in active funds, consistent with trading constraints influencing voting behavior. While these results provide evidence that ESG funds “walk the talk” with their voting behavior on average, we find that fund families play a significant role in that walk. Additionally, in an analysis of fund families that are signatories of the United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI), we find that ESG funds of PRI families are significantly more likely to support ES proposals and G proposals than non-ESG funds of PRI families. We determine that this significant difference stems from non-ESG funds of PRI families providing less support than non-ESG funds from non-PRI families. Taken together, these results provide evidence that ESG funds available to U.S. investors provide more support for shareholder proposals aligned with their designated investment objective, but the type and family of the fund influence that support

We investigate whether green innovators voluntarily provide innovation disclosure to reduce processing costs for stakeholders and gain green-specific disclosure benefits. We observe that green patenting firms provide more innovation disclosure in conference calls than do other innovating peers, controlling for patent value. Using a patent-call unit of analysis, we also provide within-firm evidence that managers highlight their green inventions more on conference calls relative to their other inventions. Green innovators provide more innovation disclosure when the costs of processing patent information are higher and anticipated disclosure benefits are greater. We find some evidence that innovation disclosure is positively associated with green fund ownership and stronger market responses to conference calls as well as proxies for ESG-related reputation. Our findings highlight both capital market and social capital benefits as motivating forces for voluntary innovation disclosure and suggest the nature of a firm’s innovations can impact its information environment

We investigate whether a firm’s social capital and the trust that it engenders are viewed favorably by bondholders. Using firms’ environmental and social (E&S) performance to proxy for social capital, we find no relation between social capital and bond spreads over the period 2006–2019. However, during the 2008–2009 financial crisis, which represents a shock to trust and default risk, high-social-capital firms benefited from lower bond spreads. These effects are stronger for firms with higher expected agency costs of debt and firms whose E&S efforts are more salient. During the crisis, high-social-capital firms were also able to raise more debt, at lower spreads, and for longer maturities. We find no evidence that the governance element of ESG is related to bond spreads. The gap between E&S performance of firms in the bottom and top E&S terciles has narrowed since the financial crisis, especially in the year prior to accessing the bond market

From 2008 to 2020, 180 of S&P 1500 have disclosed employee diversity targets. We conduct the first analysis of firms’ employee diversity targets and ask three research questions: (i) who announces diversity targets? (ii) do firms deliver on their diversity targets? (iii) what are the implications of disclosure of such targets for employee hiring and investors? We find that firms with a greater willingness (proxied by past ESG penalties, higher CEO-to-median employee pay ratio, more media coverage, and after #MeToo and Black Lives Matter movements) and ability (proxied by financial strength, a blue-collar heavy labor force, and gender and ethnic minorities on boards) to improve employee diversity are more likely to disclose diversity targets. Exploiting the Revelio dataset of 15,639 firm-years for 1,203 distinct firms from 2008 to 2020, we observe that firms that disclosed a diversity target have indeed hired more diverse employees, but such diversity levels had already increased substantially prior to the target disclosure. Firms with numerical, forward-looking, and rank-and-file employee-targeted goals are associated with greater employee diversity relative to firms that announce other types of diversity goals. Moreover, improved diversity performance does not appear to occur at the cost of employee quality, as measured by Revelio. Overall our results have practical implications for how investors and stakeholders might want to interpret corporate diversity targets