How important is equal access to mandatory disclosures? We exploit the postal strike of 1970 that caused a delay in the delivery of annual reports via mail. This strike created unequal access because certain investors (e.g., institutions) had both the incentives and ability to obtain the annual reports by other means. Theory predicts that, when differential access exists, adverse selection problems intensify, causing a decline in stock trading. Our findings support this prediction: stock trading volume decreased by approximately 28% for firms unable to deliver the annual reports to shareholders during the strike, and this trading decline gradually dissipated afterward. Further tests confirm adverse selection as the primary mechanism. Overall, our paper underscores the importance of equal access to annual reports—a key mandated disclosure—and demonstrates the value of these reports to shareholders, as evidenced by their reluctance to trade absent this information.

We examine the dynamic nature of the information content of aggregate earnings. Specifically, we examine how changes in supply elasticity affect the relation between aggregate earnings and future inflation. Using total capacity utilization to capture supply elasticity, we find that aggregate earnings are more informative about inflation when the supply is inelastic. This finding aligns with the investment demand hypothesis—higher aggregate earnings drive increased investment, pushing inflation higher, when supply is relatively inelastic. Furthermore, when we consider market outcomes such as three-month Treasury yields and aggregate stock returns, the role of supply elasticity pervades. That is, we find that aggregate earnings are more informative for market outcomes primarily when supply is inelastic. Finally, the relation between aggregate earnings and gross domestic product (GDP) also varies with the economy’s supply elasticity. Our findings highlight supply elasticity as a critical factor in interpreting the macroeconomic signals in aggregate earnings.