This paper critically evaluates the use of analysts’ forecasts in accounting-based valuation. Specifically, I assess the usefulness and the limitation of analysts’ forecasts in predicting future earnings and in explaining the market-to-book ratio, in light of a comprehensive set of 22 explicit information items, including: economic rent proxies, conservative accounting proxies, earnings quality signals, transitory earnings proxies, industry characteristics, and risk and growth proxies. While analysts’ forecasts capture 45–83% of the information from these sources depending on model specifications, they do not appear to fully incorporate certain information items. In particular, proxies for conservative accounting and transitory earnings are incrementally useful in predicting future earnings; proxies for economic rents, conservative accounting, and risk are incrementally useful in explaining the market-to-book ratio. Collectively, these results validate the use of analysts’ forecasts as a parsimonious proxy for forward-looking information in accounting-based valuation and suggest how to improve on their use.

We examine whether recent regulatory reforms requiring majority board independence reduce the extent of earnings management. Firms that did not have a majority of independent directors before the reforms (referred to as noncompliant firms) are required to increase their board independence. We find that, while noncompliant firms on average do not experience a significant decrease in earnings management after the reforms compared to other firms, noncompliant firms with low information acquisition cost experience a significant reduction in earnings management. The results are similar when we examine audit committee independence and when we use alternative proxies for information acquisition cost and earnings management. These findings indicate that independent directors’ monitoring is more effective in a richer information environment.

Using data from China, we examine whether and how the incentive to boost GDP growth at the government level affects earnings management at the firm level. We find that firms in provinces with GDP growth lower than the national level or the average of the adjacent provinces are more likely to engage in earnings management than firms in other provinces. Specifically, they are more likely to inflate revenues, overproduce, and delay asset impairment losses. The aggregate earnings management induced by GDP growth incentives accounts for about 0.5% of GDP. The results are stronger for local state-owned enterprises, in provinces with a lower level of marketization, for firms in provinces with younger governors, and in the years immediately prior to the turnover of provincial officials. Overall, this paper provides systematic evidence on how firms engage in earnings management to boost the GDP growth in their provinces.