Over the latest monetary policy tightening cycle, capital has been flowing from low-inflation countries to high-inflation countries. This pattern of capital flows is consistent with the predictions of an open-economy model with nominal rigidities where cost-push shocks generate an inflationary episode and capital flows freely across countries. Yet, by raising demand for domestic non-tradable goods and services, capital inflows cause unwelcome upward pressure on firms’ costs in countries most severely hit by these shocks. We find that a reverse pattern of capital flows would have improved the output-inflation trade-off globally, hence requiring a less aggressive monetary tightening in the most severely hit countries and delivering overall welfare gains.

Unemployment differentials are greater between countries in the euro area than between U.S. states. In both regions, net migration responds to unemployment differentials, though the response is smaller in the euro area compared to the U.S. We use a multi-country DSGE model with cross-border migration to quantify Mundell’s hypothesis that labour mobility could substitute for independent monetary policy in a currency union. While not as effective as independent monetary policy, increased labour mobility reduces business cycle fluctuations for most countries in the euro area. However, Mundell’s conjecture does not hold uniformly. For countries that primarily face demand shocks, labour mobility stabilizes inflation and unemployment and improves welfare. If supply shocks are dominant however, labour mobility increases the cost of being in a currency union by magnifying inflation volatility.

We study the welfare implications of the rise of common ownership in the U.S. from 1995 to 2021. We build a general equilibrium model with a hedonic demand system in which firms compete in a network game of oligopoly. Firms are connected through two large networks: the first reflects ownership overlap, the second product market rivalry. In our model, common ownership of competing firms induces unilateral incentives to soften competition and the magnitude of the common ownership effect depends on how much the two networks overlap. We estimate our model for the universe of U.S. public corporations using a combination of firm financials, investor holdings, and text-based product similarity data. We perform counterfactual calculations to evaluate how the efficiency and the distributional impact of common ownership have evolved over time. Under the assumption that firms maximise a share-weighted average of their shareholders’ income, we find that the welfare cost of common ownership, measured as the ratio of deadweight loss to total surplus, has increased about ninefold between 1995 and 2021. Under alternative assumptions about corporate governance, the deadweight loss of common ownership ranges between 3.5 and 13.2% of total surplus in 2021. The rise of common ownership has also led to a significant reallocation of surplus from consumers to producers.

What characteristics of news generate over-or-underreaction? We study the asset-pricing consequences of diagnostic expectations, a model of belief formation based on the representativeness heuristic, in a setting where news events are drawn from categories with extreme distributions of fundamentals. Our model predicts greater overreaction to news belonging to categories with more extreme outliers, or tail events. We test our theory on a comprehensive database of corporate news that includes news from twenty-four different categories, including earnings announcements, product launches, mergers and acquisition, business expansions, and client-related news. We find theory-consistent heterogeneity in investor reaction to news, with more overreaction in the form of greater post-announcement return reversals and trading volume for news categories with more extreme distributions of fundamentals.

We evaluate the efficiency of dynamic linked environmental regulation. Linked regulation allows inspectors who uncover violations at one plant to increase future enforcement at other plants that share a common owner. When compliance costs are correlated, regulators can then target scarce enforcement resources towards bad actors without inspecting everyone. We develop an empirical framework of dynamic moral hazard under linked regulation that allows for large portfolios of plants and for choices to be interdependent within the portfolio of plants and across time. Using the framework we evaluate a linked regulation scheme in Texas and find that linked regulation performs substantially better than both unlinked regulation and untargeted regulation. We test two alternative theoretical mechanisms that underpin the benefit—a “firm-wide moral hazard mechanism” and a “correlated targeting mechanism”—and find that a large share of the value of linked regulation is due to the former.

We propose a new model of internal migration, based on persistent and spatially correlated idiosyncratic utility. The model is motivated by a new fact in the data that simple moving cost models struggle to match: the t-year interstate migration rate is proportional to the square root of t. The new model maintains the tractability and flexibility of standard migration models, but better matches the dynamics of migration, including the new fact. It has substantially different welfare implications and makes different counterfactual predictions, especially in terms of dynamic adjustment and long-run responses.

We consider an oligopoly model in which each firm chooses not only its price but also its advertising strategy regarding how much, and what, product information to provide. To highlight firms’ strategic incentives, we impose no structural restrictions on feasible advertising content, so that each firm can disclose or conceal any information. We obtain a comprehensive characterization of the equilibrium advertising strategy and provide some sufficient conditions for the existence of symmetric pure-price equilibria. We show that intense competition induces firms to provide accurate product information; firms usually obfuscate consumers’ relatively low or high values; and requiring firms to provide more product information can reduce social surplus and also be harmful to consumers.

This paper studies the effects of the court-ordered removal of children from home on health, crime, and education. To isolate causal effects, I exploit quasi-random variation in judge assignment together with across-judge variation in the tendency to favour removal in an instrumental variable design. Using a novel data set (N=26,579) based on Swedish court documents that I transcribe and link with detailed register data, I find that court-ordered out-of-home placement has large adverse effects on the mortality of the marginal child. These effects are primarily driven by suicides that occur while the removed child is still placed in out-of-home care. Removal also causes an increase in hospitalizations for mental illness and non-narcotic crimes. There is little evidence of adverse health effects for birth parents. I explore potential explanations for the detrimental effects on child health. Adverse care conditions and peer exposure appear to be important channels

We study sequential experiments where sampling is costly and a decision-maker aims to determine the best treatment for full-scale implementation by (1) adaptively allocating units between two possible treatments, and (2) stopping the experiment when the expected welfare (inclusive of sampling costs) from implementing the chosen treatment is maximised. Working under a continuous time limit, we characterise the optimal policies under the minimax regret criterion. We show that the same policies also remain optimal under both parametric and non-parametric outcome distributions in an asymptotic regime where sampling costs approach zero. The minimax optimal sampling rule is just the Neyman allocation: it is independent of sampling costs and does not adapt to observed outcomes. The decision-maker halts sampling when the product of the average treatment difference and the number of observations surpasses a specific threshold. The results derived also apply to the so-called best-arm identification problem, where the number of observations is exogenously specified

We examine how shootings at schools—an increasingly common form of gun violence in the States—impact the educational and economic trajectories of students. Using linked schooling and labor market data in Texas from 1992 to 2018, we compare within-student and across-cohort changes in outcomes following a shooting to those experienced by students at matched control schools. We find that school shootings increase absenteeism and grade repetition, reduce high school graduation, college enrollment, and college completion; and reduce employment and earnings at ages 24–26 years. We further find school-level increases in the number of leadership staff and reductions in retention among teachers and teaching support staff in the years following a shooting. The adverse impacts of shootings span student characteristics, suggesting that the economic costs of school shootings are universal.