Journal Article Prices vs. Quantities: A Critical Note on the Use of Approximations Get access James M. Malcomson James M. Malcomson University of York Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 45, Issue 1, February 1978, Pages 203–207, https://doi.org/10.2307/2297096 Published: 01 February 1978

Journal Article Size and The Growth of Firms Get access J. M. Samuels J. M. Samuels University of Birmingham Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 32, Issue 2, April 1965, Pages 105–112, https://doi.org/10.2307/2296055 Published: 01 April 1965

Journal Article On the Consistency and Efficiency of Central Plans Get access J. M. Montias J. M. Montias New Haven Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 29, Issue 4, October 1962, Pages 280–290, https://doi.org/10.2307/2296304 Published: 01 October 1962

Journal Article On Measuring Economic Interrelatedness Get access J. M. Blin, J. M. Blin Northwestern University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Frederic Murphy Frederic Murphy Northwestern University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 41, Issue 3, July 1974, Pages 437–440, https://doi.org/10.2307/2296761 Published: 01 July 1974

This paper considers why organizations use promotions, rather than just monetary bonuses, to motivate employees even though this may conflict with efficient assignment of employees to jobs. When performance is unverifiable, use of promotion reduces the incentive for managers to be affected by influence activities that would blunt the effectiveness of monetary bonuses. When employees are risk neutral, use of promotion for incentives need not distort assignments. When they are risk averse, it may—sufficient conditions for this are given. The distortion may be either to promote more employees than is efficient (the Peter Principle effect) or fewer. “Promotions serve two roles in an organization. First, they help assign people to the roles where they can best contribute to the organization's performance. Second, promotions serve as incentives and rewards.” (Milgrom and Roberts (1992, p. 364)) “Promotions are used as the primary incentive device in most organizations, including corporations, partnerships, and universities … This … is puzzling to us because promotion-based incentive schemes have many disadvantages and few advantages relative to bonus-based incentive schemes.” (Baker, Jensen and Murphy (1988, p. 600))

M. K. Block, J. M. Heineke; A Comment on Uncertainty and Household Decisions12, The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 39, Issue 4, 1 September 1972, Pages 523–

Infrequency of purchase models are alternatives to those derived from the classical "utility maximization with binding non-negativity constraints" scheme for modelling purchases that occur at random dates. An extension of those models is proposed that takes into account additional information about the exact number of times households purchased during the survey period. Various methods of estimation are described and an empirical illustration is presented with data drawn from the French Food Expenditure Survey (INSEE).

R. L. Thomas, P. J. M. Stoney; A Note on the Dynamic Properties of the Hines Inflation Model, The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 37, Issue 2, 1 April 1970,

Which decision rules are the most efficient? Which are the best in terms of maximin or maximax? We study these questions for the case of a group of individuals faced with a collective choice from a set of alternatives. A key message from our results is that the set of optimal decision rules is well defined, particularly simple, and well known: the class of scoring rules. We provide the optimal scoring rules for the three different ideals of justice under consideration: utilitarianism (efficiency), maximin, and maximax. The optimal utilitarian scoring rule depends crucially on the probability distribution of the utilities. The optimal maximin (respectively maximax) scoring rule takes the optimal utilitarian scoring rule and applies a factor that shifts it towards negative voting (respectively plurality voting).

This paper develops an extension of the classical multinomial logit model which approximates a class of models obtained when there is uncontrolled taste variation across agents and choices in addition to the stochastic noise inherent in the logit model. Unlike semiparametric and parametric alternatives, the extended logit model is easy to estimate even when there are many potential choices. Unlike parametric alternatives, it does not require the specification of a distribution of varying tastes. The extended logit model can give a quick indication of the impact of taste variation on estimates and it generates estimates of the covariances of the taste shifters. It can be used as an exploratory device en route to the construction of a model incorporating a particular form of random taste variation and it can be used to determine whether such effort is required at all. When the amount of taste variation is not excessive the approximate model can be adequate itself. The model nests the conventional logit model which leads to a misspecification diagnostic. A method for estimating the model using conventional logit model software is proposed, asymptotic properties of estimators are derived and an application is presented.