Journal Article Intermediation with Costly Bilateral Exchange Get access Robert M. Townsend Robert M. Townsend Carnegie-Mellon University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 45, Issue 3, October 1978, Pages 417–425, https://doi.org/10.2307/2297244 Published: 01 October 1978 Article history Received: 01 February 1976 Accepted: 01 October 1977 Published: 01 October 1978

Why is it difficult to restructure sovereign debt in a timely manner? In this paper, we present a theory of the sovereign debt-restructuring process in which delay arises as individual creditors hold up a settlement in order to extract greater payments from the sovereign. We then use the theory to analyse recent policy proposals aimed at ensuring equal repayment of creditor claims. Strikingly, we show that such collective action policies may increase delay by encouraging free riding on negotiation costs, even while preventing hold-up and reducing total negotiation costs. A calibrated version of the model can account for observed delays and finds that free riding is quantitatively relevant: whereas in simple low-cost debt-restructuring operations, collective mechanisms will reduce delay by more than 60%, in high-cost complicated restructurings, the adoption of such mechanisms results in a doubling of delay.

We examine a model of long-term contracting in which the buyer is privately informed about the stochastic process by which her value for a good evolves. In addition, the realized values are also private information. We characterize a class of environments in which the profit-maximizing long-term contract offered by a monopolist takes an especially simple structure: we derive sufficient conditions on primitives under which the optimal contract consists of a menu of deterministic sequences of static contracts. Within each sequence, higher realized values lead to greater quantity provision; however, an increasing proportion of buyer types are excluded over time, eventually leading to inefficiently early termination of the relationship. Moreover, the menu choices differ by future generosity, with more costly (up front) plans guaranteeing greater quantity provision in the future. Thus, the seller screens process information in the initial period and then progressively screens across realized values so as to reduce the information rents paid in future periods.

R. Sato, M. J. Beckmann; Neutral Inventions and Production Functions1, The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 35, Issue 1, 1 January 1968, Pages 57–66, htt

We study the effects of fiscal policy interventions in a liquidity trap in a model with nominal rigidities and an interest rate rule. In a liquidity trap caused by a self-fulfilling state of low confidence, higher government spending has deflationary effects that reduce the spending multiplier when the zero lower bound is binding. Instead, cuts in marginal labour tax rates are inflationary and become more expansionary when the zero lower bound is binding. These findings contradict a popular view, based on a liquidity trap caused by a fundamental shock such as a taste shock, that higher government spending is inflationary and can therefore be associated with large multipliers at the zero lower bound, while lower marginal tax rates are deflationary and therefore counterproductive.

This article analyses contract cancellation and product return policies in markets in which sellers advise customers about the suitability of their offering. When customers are fully rational, it is optimal for sellers to offer the right to cancel or return on favourable terms. A generous return policy makes the seller's “cheap talk” at the point of sale credible. This observation provides a possible explanation for the excess refund puzzle and also has implications for the management of customer reviews. When customers are credulous, instead, sellers have an incentive to set unfavourable terms to exploit the inflated beliefs they induce in their customers. The imposition of a minimum statutory standard improves welfare and consumer surplus when customers are credulous. In contrast, competition policy reduces contractual inefficiencies with rational customers, but it is not effective with credulous customers.

We exploit recent molecular genetics evidence on the genetic basis of arsenic excretion and unique information on family links among respondents living in different environments from a large panel survey to uncover the hidden costs of arsenic poisoning in Bangladesh. We provide for the first time estimates of the effects of the ingestion and retention of inorganic arsenic on direct measures of cognitive and physical capabilities as well as on the schooling attainment, occupational structure, entrepreneurship, and incomes of the rural Bangladesh population. We also provide new estimates of the effects of the consumption of foods grown and cooked in arsenic-contaminated water on individual arsenic concentrations. The estimates are based on arsenic biomarkers obtained from a sample of members of rural households in Bangladesh who are participants in a long-term panel survey following respondents and their coresident household members over a period of 26 years.

The purpose of this paper is to estimate the parameters of household preferences that determine the allocation of goods within the period and over the life cycle, using micro data. In doing so we are able to identify important effects of demographics, labour market status and other household characteristics on the intertemporal allocation of expenditure. We test the validity of the life-cycle model using excess sensitivity tests and find that controlling for demographics and labour market status variables can largely explain the excess sensitivity of consumption to anticipated changes in income.