Financial regulation is harmonized across countries even though countries vary in their ability to bail-out their banking sector in the event of a crisis. This article addresses the question of whether countries with different fiscal capacity should optimally have different bank regulation, implemented—among other tools—through capital requirements—a question so far ignored by the theoretical banking literature. I show that countries with larger fiscal capacity should have lower ex ante minimum bank capital requirements, in an environment with endogenously incomplete markets and overinvestment due to “Too-Big-To-Fail” moral hazard and pecuniary externalities. I also show that, in addition to a minimum bank capital requirement, regulators in countries with strong “Too-Big-To-Fail” moral hazard should impose a limit on the liabilities pledged by financial institutions in a crisis state. This implies limits on put options/credit default swap contracts. Finally, I argue that the type of regulatory instrument used is crucial as to whether larger fiscal capacity implies more- or less-stringent bank regulation

How does the shadow banking system respond to changes in capital regulation of commercial banks? We propose a quantitative general equilibrium model with regulated and unregulated banks to study the unintended consequences of regulation. Tighter capital requirements for regulated banks cause higher convenience yield on debt of all banks, leading to higher shadow bank leverage and a larger shadow banking sector. At the same time, tighter regulation eliminates the subsidies to commercial banks from deposit insurance, reducing the competitive pressures on shadow banks to take risks. The net effect is a safer financial system with more shadow banking. Calibrating the model to data on financial institutions in the US, the optimal capital requirement is around 16

This article studies the effects of higher bank capital requirements. Using new firm-lender matched credit data from South Korea, we document that Basel III coincided with a 25% decline in credit from regulated banks, and an increase of similar magnitude from non-bank (shadow) lenders. We use our data to estimate the effect of capital requirements on bank credit, and the spillover effect of the reform on non-bank lending. We then build a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous banks and firms that replicates these micro estimates. We find that Basel III can account for most of the observed decrease in regulated bank lending and about three quarters of the increase in shadow lending. The latter is driven exclusively by general equilibrium effects of the reform

We study optimal enforcement in credit markets in which the only threat facing a defaulting borrower is restricted access to financial markets. We solve for the optimal level of exclusion, and link it to observed institutional arrangements. Regulation in this environment must accomplish two objectives. First, it must prevent borrowers from defaulting on one bank and transferring their resources to another bank. Second, and less obviously, it must give banks the incentive to make sizeable loans, and to honour their promises of future credit. We establish that the optimal regulation resembles observed laws governing default on debt. Moreover, if debtors have the right to a “fresh start” after bankruptcy then this must be balanced by enforceable provisions against fraudulent conveyance. Our optimal regulation is robust, in that it can be implemented in a way that does not require the regulator to have information about either the borrower or lender. Our results isolate the way in which specific institutions surrounding bankruptcy—namely rules governing asset garnishment and fraudulent conveyances—support loan markets in which borrowers have no collateral

I quantitatively analyse the macroeconomic impacts of raising capital requirements in a model in which heterogeneous firms may choose either intermediated or direct finance. Heterogeneous banks compete with other banks and the bond market, fund loans with insured deposits and costly equity (subject to a minimum capital-to-asset ratio), and monitor borrowers. I find that tighter capital requirements reduce costly bank failures while having only small effects on key macroeconomic aggregates, and that raising capital requirements above current levels can be welfare-improving. Three main forces give rise to these results. First, even though banks cut loan supply for a given level of net worth under a tighter capital requirement, in equilibrium banks’ net worth rises to dampen this effect. Second, intense competition from the non-bank sector disciplines banks’ lending responses to tighter regulation. Third, substitution by corporate firms offsets much of the decline in debt financing associated with tighter bank loan supply. As a corollary, almost all of the modest costs associated with tighter capital requirements are concentrated within the bank-dependent non-corporate sector

The recent unravelling of the Eurozone’s financial integration raised concerns about feedback loops between sovereign and banking insolvency. This article provides a theory of the feedback loop that allows for both domestic bailouts of the banking system and sovereign debt forgiveness by international creditors or solidarity by other countries. Our theory has important implications for the re-nationalization of sovereign debt, macroprudential regulation, and the rationale for banking unions

We study the aggregate and redistributive effects of currency devaluations in a small open economy model with leverage-constrained banks and heterogeneous households. Our framework captures three stylized facts about financial dollarization in emerging economies: (1) a sizable share of domestic deposits is denominated in foreign currency; (2) these deposits represent significant foreign currency liabilities for local banks; and (3) dollar deposits are mainly held by wealthier households. A devaluation increases the real burden of foreign currency debt, causing an erosion of banks’ net worth, which depresses credit supply and economic activity. While richer households are partially insulated through their dollar deposits, poorer households cut consumption sharply in response to rising borrowing costs and falling real labor income. In our model deposit, dollarization amplifies the contractionary effects of a devaluation on output, investment, and consumption, in line with new empirical evidence for emerging economies. To achieve this result, both constrained intermediaries and heterogeneous households are crucial. In our framework, regulating dollarization can result in widespread welfare gains, especially for poorer households

Based on an asset demand system, we develop a framework to quantify the impact of market trends and changes in regulation on asset prices, price informativeness, and the wealth distribution. Our leading applications are the transition from active to passive investment management and climate-induced shifts in asset demand. The transition from active to passive investment management had a large impact on equity prices but a small impact on price informativeness because capital did not flow from more to less informed investors on average. This finding is based on a new measure of investor-level informativeness that identifies which investors are more informed about future profitability. Climate-induced shifts in asset demand have a potentially large impact on equity prices and the wealth distribution, implying capital gains for passive investment advisors, pension funds, insurance companies, and private banking and capital losses for active investment advisors and hedge funds