Knowledge that Transforms

This paper investigates the role of money in markets in which producers haveprivate information about the quality of the goods they supply. When the fractionof high-quality producers in the economy is given, money promotes the productionof high-quality goods, which improves the quality mix and welfare unambiguously.When this fraction is endogenous, however, we find that money can decreasewelfare relative to the barter equilibrium. The origin of this inefficiency is thatmoney provides consumption insurance to low-quality producers, whichcan result in a higher fraction of low-quality producers in the monetaryequilibrium. Finally, we find that most often agents acquire more costlyinformation in the monetary equilibrium than in the barter equilibrium.Consequently, money is welfare-enhancing because it promotes usefulproduction and exchange, but not because it saves information costs. Copyright The Review of Economic Studies Limited, 2004.

We examine the robustness of information cascades in laboratory experiments. Apart from the situation in which each player can obtain a signal for free (as in the experiment by Anderson and Holt (1997), American Economic Review, 87 (5), 847–862), the case of costly signals is studied where players decide whether or not to obtain private information, at a small but positive cost. In the equilibrium of this game, only the first player buys a signal and makes a decision based on this information whereas all following players do not buy a signal and herd behind the first player. The experimental results show that too many signals are bought and the equilibrium prediction performs poorly. To explain these observations, the depth of the subjects' reasoning process is estimated, using a statistical error-rate model. Allowing for different error rates on different levels of reasoning, we find that the subjects' inferences become significantly more noisy on higher levels of the thought process, and that only short chains of reasoning are applied by the subjects.

We claim that the stock market encourages business creation, innovation, and growth by allowing the recycling of “informed capital”. Due to incentive and information problems, start-ups face larger costs of going public than mature firms. Sustaining a tight relationship with a monitor (bank, venture capitalist) allows them to finance their operations without going public until profitability prospects are clearer or incentive problems are less severe. However, the earlier young firms go public, the quicker monitors' informed capital is redirected towards new start-ups. Hence, when informed capital is in limited supply, factors that lower the costs for start-ups to go public encourage business creation. Technological spill-overs associated with business creation and thick market externalities in the young firms segment of the stock market provide prima facie cases for encouraging young firms to go public.

This paper formulates and estimates a dynamic programming model of optimal educational financing decisions. The main purpose of the paper is to measure the effect of short-term parental cash transfers, received during school, on educational borrowing and in-school work decisions, and on post-graduation lifetime earnings. The estimated parameters of the model imply that parental cash transfers do not significantly influence post-graduation lifetime earnings. Long-term factors such as family background and prior human capital investments are more important. Parental cash transfers do, however, significantly determine the decision to borrow or work during school and the level of lifetime consumption.

This paper investigates firms' incentives to invest in cost reduction in the first price sealed bid auction, a format largely used for procurement. Two central features of the model are that we allow firms to be heterogeneous and that investment is observable. We find that firms will tend to underinvest in cost reduction because they anticipate fiercer head-on competition. Using the second price auction as a benchmark, we also find that the first price auction will elicit less investment from market participants and that this is socially inefficient. These results have implications for market design when investment is important.

Procedures are presented that allow the empiricist to estimate and test asset pricing models on limited-liability securities without the assumption that thehistorical payoff distribution provides a consistent estimate of the market's priorbeliefs. The procedures effectively filter return data for unspecified historical biases in the market's priors. They do not involve explicit estimation of the market's priors, and hence, economize on parameters. The procedures derive from a new but simple property of Bayesian learning, namely: if the correct likelihood is used, the inverse posterior at the true parameter value forms a martingale process relative to the learner's information filtration augmented with the true parameter value. Application of this central result to tests of asset pricing models requires a deliberate selection bias. Hence, as a by-product, the article establishes that biased samples contain information with which to falsify an asset pricing model or estimate its parameters. These include samples subject to, "e.g." survivorship bias or Peso problems. Copyright The Review of Economic Studies Limited, 2004.

This paper examines monopoly power in the market for groundwater (irrigation water extracted by private tubewells), a market characterized by barriers to entry and spatial fragmentation. In Pakistan's Punjab region, groundwater and tenancy contracts are often interlinked, with share-tenants gaining access to water through the use of their landlord's tubewell. An analysis of groundwater transactions shows that tenants of tubewell owners are charged lower prices than other customers. Tubewell owners and their tenants also use considerably more groundwater on their plots than other farmers. Using detailed price and quantity data, the efficiency and distributional implications of this monopoly power are explored.

Previous work has had difficulty generating household saving behavior that makes the distribution of wealth much more concentrated than that of labor earnings, and that makes the richest households hold onto large amounts of wealth, even during very old age. I construct a quantitative, general equilibrium, overlapping-generations model in which parents and children are linked by accidental and voluntary bequests and by earnings ability. I show that voluntary bequests can explain the emergence of large estates, while accidental bequests alone cannot, and that adding earnings persistence within families increases wealth concentration even more. I also show that the introduction of a bequest motive generates lifetime savings profiles more consistent with the data.