Knowledge that Transforms

Journal Article Travel Fund Get access The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 68, Issue 1, January 2001, Page 231, https://doi.org/10.1111/restud/68.1.231 Published: 01 January 2001

Travel Fund The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 68, Issue 2, April 2001, Page 465, https://doi.org/10.1111/restud/68.2.465 Published: 01 April 2001

Journal Article Travel Fund Get access The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 68, Issue 4, October 2001, Page 905, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937X.00195 Published: 01 October 2001

This paper derives optimal income tax formulas using compensated and uncompensated elasticities of earnings with respect to tax rates. A simple formula for the high income optimal tax rate is obtained as a function of these elasticities and the thickness of the top tail of the income distribution. In the general non-linear income tax problem, this method using elasticities shows precisely how the different economic effects come into play and which are the key relevant parameters in the optimal income tax formulas of Mirrlees. The optimal non-linear tax rate formulas are expressed in terms of elasticities and the shape of the income distribution. These formulas are implemented numerically using empirical earning distributions and a range of realistic elasticity parameters.

In this paper we model the evolution of income risk and consumption growth. We decompose the time series innovation of the income process into its common and cohort-specific components. From these we compute conditional variances which are used as separate risk terms in a consumption growth equation. Using a long series of British household data we exploit the time-series variation to identify precautionary saving effects and find strong evidence of their importance. Specifically, after allowing for demographic and labour market status, there is an independent role for income risk in explaining consumption growth. Rather than the component that is common across cohorts, however, it is the cohort-specific element that is important in determining changes in consumption growth. This result points to a failure of between-cohort insurance mechanisms.

We examine a market in which long-lived firms face a short-term incentive to exert low effort, but could earn higher profits if it were possible to commit to high effort. There are two types of firms, "inept" firms who can only exert low effort, and "competent" firms who have a choice between high and low effort. There is occasional exit, and competent and inept potential entrants compete for the right to inherit the departing firm's reputation. Consumers receive noisy signals of effort choice, and so competent firms choose high effort in an attempt to distinguish themselves from inept firms. A competent firm is most likely to enter the market by purchasing an average reputation, in the hopes of building it into a good reputation, than either a very low reputation or a very high reputation. Inept firms, in contrast, find it more profitable to either buy high reputations and deplete them or buy low reputations.

In a general equilibrium model, we allow for households with several, typically heterogeneous, members; households that make (efficient) collective consumption decisions where different households may use different collective decision mechanisms; yet households that operate within a competitive market environment. The interaction of two allocation mechanisms, collective decisions and competitive markets, is investigated, with a focus on the efficiency properties and decentralization possibilities of the dual allocation mechanism.