Journal Article On Optimum Tariff Structures Get access J. de V. Graaff J. de V. Graaff Cambridge Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 17, Issue 1, 1949, Pages 47–59, https://doi.org/10.2307/2295788 Published: 01 April 1949

Journal Article The Belgian Monetary Reform: An Appraisal of the Results Get access A. V. de Ridder A. V. de Ridder Brussels, Belgium Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 16, Issue 1, 1948, Pages 25–40, https://doi.org/10.2307/2296141 Published: 01 April 1948

The Geometrical Representation of Complementarity F. A.v. Hayek F. A.v. Hayek London Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 10, Issue 2, Summer 1943, Pages 122–125, https://doi.org/10.2307/2967429 Published: 01 July 1943

Journal Article Family Budget Data and Price-Elasticities of Demand Get access C. E. V. Leser C. E. V. Leser Cambridge Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 9, Issue 1, November 1941, Pages 40–57, https://doi.org/10.2307/2967637 Published: 01 November 1941

Quantile regression (QR) is an increasingly important empirical tool in economics and other sciences for analysing the impact a set of regressors has on the conditional distribution of an outcome. Extremal QR, or QR applied to the tails, is of interest in many economic and financial applications, such as conditional value at risk, production efficiency, and adjustment bands in (S,s) models. This paper provides feasible inference tools for extremal conditional quantile models that rely on extreme value approximations to the distribution of self-normalized QR statistics. The methods are simple to implement and can be of independent interest even in the univariate (non-regression) case. We illustrate the results with two empirical examples analysing extreme fluctuations of a stock return and extremely low percentiles of live infant birthweight in the range between 250 and 1500 g.

This paper demonstrates the existence and robustness of partially revealing rational expectations equilibria in general exchange economies when some traders have non-smooth ambiguity-averse preferences. This finding illustrates that models with non-smooth ambiguity aversion provide a relatively tractable framework through which partial information revelation may be studied in a general equilibrium setting without relying on particular distributional or von Neumann–Morgenstern utility assumptions or the presence of “noise.”

A seller with two objects faces a group of bidders who are subject to budget constraints. The objects have common values to all bidders but need not be identical, and may be either complements or substitutes. In a simple complete information setting we show: (1) if the objects are sold by means of a sequence of open ascending auctions, then it is always optimal to sell the more valuable object first; (2) the sequential auction yields more revenue than the simultaneous ascending auction used recently by the FCC if the discrepancy in the values is large, or if there are significant complementarities; (3) a hybrid simultaneous-sequential form is revenue superior to the sequential auction; and (4) budget constraints arise endogenously.

This paper presents a simple general equilibrium model of optimal taxation in which both private agents and the government can default on their debt. As a benchmark we consider Ramsey equilibria in which the government can precommit to its policies at the beginning of time, but in which private agents can default. We then consider sustainable equilibria in which both government and private agent decision rules are required to be sequentially rational. We completely characterize the set of sustainable equilibria. In particular, we show that when there is sufficiently little discounting and government consumption fluctuates enough, the Ramsey allocations and policies (in which the government never defaults) can be supported by a sustainable equilibrium.