Knowledge that Transforms

The marketing literature refers to the concept of brand capital and provides empirical evidence that firms with a large stock of well-established brands have an advantage in introducing new products. This paper develops a theory of brand extension as a mechanism for informational leverage in which a firm leverages off a good's reputation in one market to alleviate the problem of informational asymmetry encountered in other markets. It is shown that brand extension helps a multi-product monopolist introduce a new experience good with less price distortion. Thus, the paper provides a theoretical foundation for the concept of brand capital.

This paper extends the bargaining and matching literature, such as Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985), by considering a new matching process. We assume that a central information agency exists, such as real estate agencies in the housing market and employment agencies (or newspapers) in the labour market, which puts traders into direct contact with each other. With heterogeneity of trader preferences, equilibrium trade is characterized by existing traders on each side of the market trying to match with the flow of new traders on the other side (since existing traders have already sampled and rejected each other). Two procedures of trade co-exist, namely a strategic bilateral bargaining process and a competitive bidding process, depending on the number of potential matches a new trader obtains. We characterize the unique symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium to this stochastic trading game.

We examine the characteristics of optimal monetary policies in a general equilibrium model with incomplete markets. Markets are incomplete because of uninsured preference uncertainty, and because productive capital is traded infrequently. Rational individuals are willing to hold a liquid asset—“money”—at a premium. Monetary policy interacts with existing financial institutions to determine this premium, as well as the level of precautionary holdings. We show that inflation is expansionary, and that the optimal inflation rate is positive if there is no operative banking system (the Tobin effect). Otherwise, efficiency requires that money be undominated in its rate of return (the Friedman Rule).

This paper introduces the concept of a factor subspace in competitive equilibrium asset pricing. A factor subspace contains the market portfolio and is such that every marketed contingent claim is second-order stochastically dominated by a claim from the factor subspace. Conditions are given for the existence of equilibrium, and it is shown how APT and CAPM can be interpreted in the framework of the paper. If sufficiently many call options on the market portfolio are traded, then the space spanned by these options can be used as the factor subspace.

Drawing upon recent contributions in the statistical literature, we present new results on the convergence of recursive, stochastic algorithms which can be applied to economic models with learning and which generalize previous results. The formal results provide probability bounds for convergence which can be used to describe the local stability under learning of rational expectations equilibria in stochastic models. Economic examples include local stability in a multivariate linear model with multiple equilibria and global convergence in a model with a unique equilibrium.

This paper develops methods for constructing asymptotically valid confidence intervals for the date of a single break in multivariate time series, including I(0), I(1), and deterministically trending regressors. Although the width of the asymptotic confidence interval does not decrease as the sample size increases, it is inversely related to the number of series which have a common break date, so there are substantial gains to multivariate inference about break dates. These methods are applied to two empirical examples: the mean growth rate of output in three European countries, and the mean growth rate of U.S. consumption, investment, and output.

This paper develops a general approach to characterizing optimal income tax and enforcement schemes. Our analysis clarifies the nature of the interplay between tax rates, audit probabilities and penalties for misreporting. In particular, it is shown that for a variety of objective functions for the principal the optimal tax schedule is in general concave (at least weakly) and monotonic; the marginal tax rates determine the audit probabilities; and less harsh penalties lead to higher enforcement costs. Our results imply that there exists a tradeoff between equity and efficiency considerations in the enforcement context which is similar to that in the moral hazard context for tax policy.

The paper presents a model in which a population of agents repeatedly play games against nature; the rules of behaviour followed are revised over time through a process of imitation. For binary decisions, imitation selects rules consistent with a preference relation of the kind proposed by SSB utility theory and regret theory. In general, this preference relation need not satisfy either independence or transitivity; we state conditions on imitation necessary for it to do so. For decisions over three or more options, the long-run tendency is for options that are maximally preferred in terms of SSB preferences to be chosen. If no maximally preferred option exists, the process of imitation may not converge.

Most policy debates on regional policies implicitly assume that there is too much concentration. In our two-region economy model of migration, desirable concentration fails to occur under some conditions, and undesirable concentration occurs in others. In the latter case, even though the individuals collectively prefer to be distributed evenly across the two regions, they end up concentrating into one region in their pursuit of better life. Hence, the freedom to move can be self-defeating. The authors characterize the conditions for such self-defeating concentration. The coordination failures between the entry decision of service firms and the migration decision of individuals are caused by the incompleteness of markets due to the endogeneity of the range of services available, which deprive the agents of the opportunity to signal demand and supply for potential services. The argument does not rely on price distortions, the nonconvexities implied by increasing returns and nontradedness, congestion externalities) nor myopia in migration decisions. Copyright 1998 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.

This paper examines the extent to which swings in stock prices can be related to variations in the discounted value of expected future dividends when investors face uncertainty about their future behaviour. I develop an econometric model that accounts for the instability of U.S. dividend growth and discount rates during the past 120 years. Estimates of the model reveal that changing forecasts of future dividend growth account for more than 90% of the predictable variations in dividend-prices. The estimates also imply that instability in the dividend and discount rate processes contribute significantly to the predictability of long-horizon stock returns.