Knowledge that Transforms

Does the market economy exacerbate inequality across households? In a capitalistick society, does the rich maintain a high level of wealth at the expense of the poor? Or would an accumulation of the wealth by the rich eventually trickle down to the poor and pull the latter out of poverty? This paper presents a theoretical framework, in which one can address these questions in a systematic way. The model focuses on the role of credit market, which determines the joint evolution of the distribution of wealth and the interest rate. A complete characterization of the steady states is provided. Under some configurations of the parameter values, the model predicts an endogenous and permanent separation of the population into the rich and the poor, where the rich maintains a high level of wealth partially due to the presence of the poor. Under others, the model predicts the Kuznets curve, i.e., the wealth eventually trickles down from the rich to the poor, eliminating inequality in the long run.

Each player in an infinite population interacts strategically with a finite subset of that population. Suppose each player's binary choice in each period is a best response to the population choices of the previous period. When can behaviour that is initially played by only a finite set of players spread to the whole population? This paper characterizes when such contagion is possible for arbitrary local interaction systems. Maximal contagion occurs when local interaction is sufficiently uniform and there is low neighbour growth, i.e. the number of players who can be reached in k steps does not grow exponentially in k.

We model an organization as a hierarchy of managers erected on top of a technology (here consisting of a collection of plants). In our framework, the role of a manager is to take steps to reduce the adverse consequences of shocks that affect the plants beneath him. We argue that different organizational forms give rise to different information about managers' performance and therefore differ according to how effective incentives can be in encouraging a good performance. In particular, we show that, under certain assumptions, the M-form (multi-divisional form) is likely to provide better incentives than the U-form (unitary form) because it promotes yardstick competition (i.e. relative performance evaluation) more effectively. We conclude by presenting evidence that the assumptions on which this comparison rests are satisfied for Chinese data.

This paper presents a model of exchange rate behaviour in a multilateral target zone. The model produces new economic insights beyond the well-known bilateral model of Krugman (1991), which is obtained as a special case. The paper also introduces a new class of stochastic processes in economics, namely multidimensional reflected diffusion processes. Two main features characterize the economics of exchange rates in a multilateral target zone. (i) The restrictions on interventions imposed by cross-currency constraints: when one country changes its money supply, say because its exchange rate with a second country has hit its band, all exchange rates involving the currency of that particular country will be affected, regardless of their position within their respective bands, (ii) Cooperation in sharing the intervention burden: in general, the exchange rate between any two countries will depend on the fundamentals of third countries in a multilateral target zone. This is because if the monetary authorities intervene together, a shock in the fundamentals of any country will induce a revision of the expectation of future interventions of other countries. The model reverts the counterfactual predictions of the bilateral model that the exchange rate steady-state density should be U-shaped and that its volatility should be a decreasing function of the distance of the exchange rate to the limits of its band. Thus, accounting for the multilateral feature of real-world target zones allows us to reconcile target zone models with the most salient empirical features of exchange rate behaviour.

We study price discrimination where consumers know at the time of contracting only the distribution of their valuations but subsequently learn their actual valuations. Consumers are sequentially screened, as in a menu of refund contracts. Initial valuation uncertainty can differ in terms of first-order stochastic dominance or mean-preserving-spread. In both cases, optimal mechanisms depend on informativeness of consumers' initial knowledge about their valuations, not on uncertainty that affects all consumers. It can be optimal to “subsidize” consumers with smaller valuation uncertainty through low refund to reduce the rent to those who face greater uncertainty and purchase more “flexible” contracts.

Eric Maskin, John Riley; Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions, The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 67, Issue 3, 1 July 2000, Pages 439–454, https://d

We analyse the decision of an agent with time-inconsistent preferences to consume a good that exerts an externality on future welfare. The extent of the externality is initially unknown, but may be learned via a costless sampling procedure. We show that when the agent cannot commit to future consumption and learning decisions, incomplete learning may occur on a Markov perfect equilibrium path of the resulting intra-personal game. In such a case, each agent's incarnation stops learning for some values of the posterior distribution of beliefs and acts under self-restricted information. This conduct is interpreted as strategic ignorance. All equilibria featuring this property strictly Pareto dominate the complete learning equilibrium for any posterior distribution of beliefs.

This paper explains why firms with identical opportunities may use different technologies and offer different wages. Our key assumption is that workers must engage in costly search in order to gather information about jobs (Stigler (1961)). In equilibrium, some firms adopt high fixed cost, high productivity technologies, offer high wages, and fill job openings quickly. Other firms adopt less capital-intensive technologies and offer low wages, hiring mostly uninformed workers. In equilibrium, the amount of wage dispersion leaves workers indifferent about whether to gather information, and the fraction of informed workers leaves firms indifferent about their wage and technology choice. We show that worker search, which would appear to be a rent-seeking activity in partial equilibrium, may be efficiency-enhancing in general equilibrium.

We construct a tractable, flexible-functional-form estimator of cumulative distribution functions for non-negative random variables which admits large numbers of covariates. The estimator adopts and extends techniques from the spell-duration literature for estimating hazard functions to distribution functions for wages, earnings, and income. We apply these methods to investigate sources of wage inequality for full-time male workers between Canada and the United States, finding that the Canadian wage density has a thinner left tail because low-educated workers have higher pay and a thinner right tail because of a lower proportion of highly-educated workers. Unions appear to play a large role in these outcomes.

The paper extends Diamond's (1984) analysis of financial intermediation to allow for risk aversion of the intermediary. As in the case of risk neutrality, the agency costs of external funds provided to an intermediary are relatively small if the intermediary is financing many entrepreneurs with independent returns. Even though the intermediary is adding rather than subdividing risks, the underlying large-numbers argument is not invalidated by the presence of risk aversion. With risk aversion of entrepreneurs as well as the intermediary, financial intermediation provides insurance as well as finance. In contrast to earlier results on optimal intermediation policies under risk neutrality, the paper shows that when an intermediary is financing many entrepreneurs with independent returns, optimal intermediation policies must shift return risks away from risk averse entrepreneurs and impose them on the intermediary or on final investors.