Knowledge that Transforms

The gains from monetary policy cooperation depend on real and financial distortions in the economy and evolve dynamically with prevailing economic conditions. We show that, with international trade in assets, these gains are driven by asymmetric cross-border developments in productivity and savings, and can reach multiples of the cost of economic fluctuations. When financial flows are restricted to nonstate-contingent bonds, the gains from cooperation grow with the size of global imbalances, i.e. net-foreign-asset positions.

We characterize optimal product market policy in an unequal economy in which firm ownership is concentrated and markups increase with firm market shares. We study the problem of a utilitarian regulator who designs revenue-neutral interventions in the product market. We show that optimal policy increases product market concentration. This is because policies that encourage larger producers to expand improve allocative efficiency, increase the demand for labour and equilibrium wages. We derive these results both in a static Mirrleesian setting in which we impose no constraints on the shape of interventions, as well as in a dynamic economy with wealth accumulation. In our dynamic economy optimal policy reduces wealth and income inequality by redistributing market share and profits from medium-sized businesses, which are primarily owned by relatively rich entrepreneurs, to larger diversified corporate firms.

We develop a generic and transparent calibration strategy for simple climate models used in economics. The goal is to choose the free model parameters such as to best match the output of large-scale Earth System Models from the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project, run on pre-defined emissions scenarios. We propose to jointly use four different test cases that are considered pivotal in the climate science literature: two highly idealized tests to separately examine the carbon cycle and the temperature response, and two tests closer to real scenarios, incorporating gradual changes in CO2 emissions and exogenous forcings. To illustrate the applicability of our method, we re-calibrate the free parameters of the climate part of the seminal DICE-2016 model for three different CMIP5 model responses: the multi-model mean as well as two CMIP5 models that exhibit extreme but still permissible equilibrium climate sensitivities. As an additional novelty, our calibrations of DICE-2016 allow for an arbitrary time step in the model explicitly. By applying our comprehensive suite of tests, we i) confirm that both the temperature equations and the carbon cycle in DICE-2016 are miscalibrated and ii) we show that by re-calibrating coefficients all CMIP5 targets considered can be well matched. Finally, we apply the economic model from DICE-2016 in combination with the newly calibrated climate model to compute the social cost of carbon and optimal warming. We find the social cost of carbon to be similar to DICE-2016, while the optimal long-run temperature is almost one degree lower. The social cost of carbon turns out to be much less sensitive to the discount rate than in DICE-2016. We explain how the model's climate part relates to these differences. As the temperature in DICE-2016 under optimal mitigation falls outside the range of CMIP5 projections, we caution that one might want to be skeptical about policy advice based on DICE-2016.

Many studies have documented that the sales concentration of U.S. producers has risen in recent decades. In this article, we show that this increase was accompanied by more entry and growth of foreign competitors. Using confidential census data covering the universe of all firm sales in the U.S. manufacturing sector, we find that rising import competition increased concentration among U.S. firms by reallocating sales from smaller to larger U.S. firms and by causing firm exit. However, this increase in production concentration was counteracted by the expansion of foreign firms, which reduced domestic firms’ share of the U.S. market inclusive of foreign firms’ sales. We find that once the sales of foreign exporters are taken into account, U.S. market concentration in manufacturing was stable between 1992 and 2012.

I build a macroeconomic model that features chronic excess capacity. Firms can use their capacity to compete for buyers who are not fully attentive to prices. If one firm expands capacity while other firms do not, it “steals” or attracts profitable demand from others. Theoretically, I show that this capacity competition can cause an over-accumulation of capacity. In the presence of chronic excess capacity, capital resources can be slack, and demand shocks can have large effects on output. The model is consistent with stylized facts about capacity utilization and survey evidence from Switzerland. Quantitatively, when the model is estimated to match the U.S. macro data, demand shocks turn out to be the main driving forces of business cycles.

While survey evidence suggests widespread financial fragility in the U.S., causal evidence on the implications of typical, negative income shocks is scarce. I estimate the impact of speeding fines on household finances using administrative traffic citation records and a panel of credit reports. Event studies reveal that fines averaging $195 are associated with a $34 increase in unpaid bills in collections. Given additional evidence that fine payment explains this effect and that default is the “last resort” for households, I interpret this finding as suggesting rates of inability to meet unplanned expenses which are consistent with the survey evidence. I also find that fines are associated with longer-run declines in credit scores, borrowing limits, and the likelihood of appearing as employed in payroll records covering a subset of large, high-paying employers. This impact on employment situations appears attributable to the diminished financial position of households rather than, e.g. downstream license suspensions.

We measure individual-level loss aversion using three incentivized, representative surveys of the U.S. population (combined N=3,000). We find that around 50% of the U.S. population is loss tolerant—they are willing to accept negative-expected-value gambles that contain a loss. This is counter to expert predictions and earlier findings—which mostly come from laboratory/student samples—that 70–90% of participants are loss averse. Consistent with the different findings in our study versus the prior literature, loss aversion is more prevalent in people with high cognitive ability. Further, our measure of gain–loss attitudes exhibits similar temporal stability and better predictive power outside our survey than measures of risk aversion. Loss-tolerant individuals are more likely to report recent gambling, investing a higher percentage of their assets in stocks, and experiencing financial shocks. These results support the general hypothesis that individuals value gains and losses differently, and that gain–loss attitudes are an important economic preference. However, the tendency in a large proportion of the population to emphasize gains over losses is an overlooked behavioural phenomenon.

Using large-scale survey data covering more than 110 countries and exploiting within-country variation across cohorts and surveys, we show that individuals with longer exposure to democracy display stronger support for democratic institutions, and that this effect is almost entirely driven by exposure to democracies with successful performance in terms of economic growth, control of corruption, peace and political stability, and public goods provision. Across a variety of specifications, estimation methods, and samples, the results are robust, and the timing and nature of the effects are consistent with our interpretation. We also present suggestive evidence that democratic institutions that receive support from their citizens perform better in the face of negative shocks.

We study behavioural responses to personal wealth taxes in Colombia. We utilise tax microdata from 1993 to 2016 linked with the leaked Panama Papers to investigate offshoring to the country’s key tax havens. We leverage variation from discrete jumps in tax liability and four major reforms to the wealth tax system, including changes in tax rates and duration, using bunching and difference-in-difference techniques. We find compelling evidence that taxpayers instantly reduce the wealth they declare in response to a wealth tax. Moreover, these effects can persist for years even after the wealth tax is no longer in place, providing the first evidence of a hysteresis effect for a temporary tax policy. The response is driven by misreporting items that authorities cannot cross-verify, such as overstating debt and understating non-third-party-reported business assets. Additionally, the wealthiest taxpayers respond to wealth tax increases by hiding assets in hard-to-track entities in tax havens.

We introduce a novel strategy to study the intergenerational transmission of human capital skills, net of genetic skill transfers. For this purpose, we use unique Danish data on children conceived through sperm and egg donation in in vitro fertilization treatments to estimate the relationship between child test scores and parental years of schooling. Because the assignment of donors is not selective, these parental schooling estimates allow for a causal nurture interpretation. Once we take account of genes, we find that only the education of mothers matters: the association between father’s education and child test scores (in reading and math) is insignificant and practically zero, whereas the association between mother’s education and child test scores (in reading, not in math) is significant and large, and as large as the association we estimate for mothers of non-donor children.