This paper attempts to provide a unified analysis of the effects of taxation on the equilibrium value of marginal q under alternative financial policies. It is shown that the q approach does not avoid all the specification problems associated with analyses based on the cost of capital. The (theoretically and empirically) crucial relationship between average and marginal q is also examined, and it is shown that, under UK and US tax rules, the possibility of winding up precludes persistent undervaluation in equilibrium.

Journal Article Spectral Analysis of the Term Structure of Interest Rates Get access C. W. J. Granger, C. W. J. Granger University of Nottingham Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar H. J. B. Rees H. J. B. Rees University of Nottingham Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 35, Issue 1, January 1968, Pages 67–76, https://doi.org/10.2307/2974408 Published: 01 January 1968

Standard models of employment fluctuations cannot reconcile the unemployment rate's remarkable persistence with the high job-finding rates found in worker flows data. A matching model emphasizing high hazard rates among newly formed firm-worker matches can resolve this shortcoming. In the model, matches are experience goods; consequently, newly employed workers face higher hazard rates.Following a job loss, workers may experience several short-lived jobs before finding stable employment. At an aggregate level, an initial burst of job loss precipitates a steady flow of recurring job loss. A simulation shows that this recurring job loss can account for the fact that the unemployment rate remains elevated for as much as 4 or 5 years following an initial jump. Copyright The Review of Economic Studies Limited, 2004.

In this paper, I study the theoretical and econometric implications of agents' uncertainty concerning their future consumption when a monopolist offers them either a unique, mandatory nonlinear tariff or a choice in advance from a menu of optional two-part tariffs. Agents' uncertainty is resolved through individual and privately known shocks to their types. In such a situation the principal may screen agents according to their ex ante or ex post type, by offering either a menu of optional tariffs or a standard nonlinear schedule. The theoretical implications of the model are used to evaluate a tariff experiment run by South Central Bell in two cities in Kentucky in 1986. The empirical approach explicitly accounts for the existence of informational asymmetries between local telephone users and the monopolist, leading to different, nested, econometric specifications under symmetric and asymmetric information. The empirical evidence suggests that there exists a significant asymmetry of information between consumers and the monopolist under both tariff regimes. All expected welfare components failed to increase with the introduction of optional tariffs for the estimated value of the parameters.

Principal-agent models are studied, in which outcomes conditional on the agent's action are uncertain, and the agent's behaviour therefore unobservable. For a model with bounded agent's utility, conditions are given under which the first-best equilibrium can be approximated arbitrarily closely by contracts relating payment to observable outcomes. For general models, it is shown that the solution may not always be obtained by using the agent's first-order conditions as constraint. General conditions of Lagrangean type are given for problems in which contracts are finite-dimensional.

This paper studies the stability of competitive equilibria in a model of aggregate employment when the representative agent uses a least-squares forecasting procedure. It is shown that the Pareto inferior low employment steady state is always unstable under least-squares learning, even if it is stable under perfect foresight. The high employment steady state is stable under learning if and only if it is saddle point stable under perfect foresight. This weakens multiple equilibrium theories of coordination failure that purport to explain persistently high unemployment. The Pareto superior high employment steady state will be the focal point of individual forecasting.

If prices have an allocational role, then in addition to their economic signalling, they may act as a statistical signal for the existence of selection bias in cross-sectional studies with some form of price (wages, rental, yield etc.) as dependent variable. Elements of competitive selection appear in the pricing theory of real or financial assets and in the determination of wage rates, where prices correlate the characteristics of the asset or job with those of the individuals, under the equilibrium allocation. If prices achieve such an allocation, then regressions with price as dependent variable are prima facie "mixed-index" in character, with adverse bias or consistency properties, no matter that the right-hand regressors are apparently exogenous. We set up a paradigm for competitive selection and use the concepts so generated to codify the conditions under which mixed index bias will occur. The problem may be regarded as one of selection bias, but does not necessarily derive from classical simultaneity, and is a problem of data-generation structures rather than sample selection.

This paper describes several learning processes which converge, with probability one, to the rational expectations (Bayesian-Nash) equilibrium of a stationary linear game. The learning processes include a test for convergence to equilibrium, and a method for changing the parameters of the process when non-convergence is indicated. This self-stabilization property eliminates the need to impose stability conditions on the economic environment. Convergence to equilibrium is proved for two types of self-stabilizing learning mechanisms: a centralized forecasting mechanism and a decentralized strategy adjustment process.

This paper describes a simple framework for evaluating the allocative performance of economies characterized by trading frictions and unemployment. This framework integrates the normative results of earlier Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides bilateral matching-bargaining models of trade coordination and price-setting, and consists of a set of general conditions for constrained Pareto efficient resource allocation that are applicable to conventional natural rate models. To illustrate, several conventional models of the labour market are reformulated as matching-bargaining problems and analyzed using this framework.

Under the laws of most countries, a distinction is made between gains and losses by businesses. Losses that must be “carried forward” are subjept to two penalties: a loss of interest, and expiration. Previous examinations have focused on the higher expected tax payments such a tax system without “full loss offset” imposes on risky projects. This paper presents a dynamic analysis of the impact of taxation on investment when gains and losses are treated asymmetrically. The results demonstrate how firm characteristics and the timing of taxes can influence behaviour.