Knowledge that Transforms

If stock-outs are ignored and if demand shocks are additive, then optimal behaviour requires that the marginal cost of production (MC) be equated with the expected marginal revenue of increasing expected sales by one unit (EMR). However, with more general demand shocks (and still ignoring stock-outs), the excess of MC over EMR has the same sign as the covariance of the slope of the demand curve and the marginal valuation of inventory. The equality of EMR and MC is also broken by taking account of stock-outs, even if demand shocks are additive. If there is a production lag, then taking account of stock-outs implies that optimal behaviour will be characterized by production smoothing even if the cost of production is linear. Two alternative definitions of production smoothing are presented and optimal behaviour in the presence of stock-outs displays each type of smoothing.

We explore a managerial model of investment behaviour in which an incentive problem arises because one input factor (managerial effort) is not publicly observed. We show that an optimal incentive contract leads to investment levels which are below first-best in low states and that this phenomenon can account for greater cyclical variability in aggregate production and investment. From the perspective of incentive scheme design, a special feature of the model is that screening takes place over two variables (investment and output) rather than one as is customary.

This study builds on recent research giving the notion of capacity utilization clearer economic foundations. In this research optimal output Y* is defined as the minimum point on the firm's short-run average total cost curve, and capacity utilization is then computed as CU=Y/Y*, where Y is actual output. Here I extend these concepts to include adjustment costs due to changes in the stock of capital, and nonstatic expectations of future output demand and input prices. The more general notion of CU is shown to depend on the shadow values of the firm's quasifixed inputs, and is decomposed to isolate the effects of anticipatory expectations. An empirical comparison is then made between traditional indices and alternative economic CU measures, using annual U.S. manufacturing data 1954-80. The calculated indices exhibit plausible patterns, which can be interpreted as the effects of nonstatic expectations and adjustment costs.

In this note, we present a strategy which relies on multi-period contracts and on a self-selection mechanism which induces the insured to announce his true risk in the first period, thus eliminating inefficiency due to adverse selection.

This paper develops a model in which a firm writes labour contracts with workers and debt contracts with creditors. Firms have more information than do the owners of the factors of production and they are also subject to limited liability. We show that if the limited liability constraint is binding then the employment level is inefficient relative to a situation of symmetric information. The firm is then embedded into a partial equilibrium model in which the real rate of interest is exogenously determined. We show that increases in the real rate of interest increase the inefficiency of the optimal employment contract and lead to layoffs in more states of nature than would occur at lower real interest rates. 1.

We examine the dynamic path of an economy after a change in regime, when neither the policy to be followed nor the reactions of the public are known. The model is an application of Kreps and Wilson's reputation model to Barro and Gordon's macroeconomic policy game. Equilibrium is defined to be the dynamically consistent solution to a game between the government and the private sector. It involves mixed strategies and Bayesian learning by both sides until the uncertainty about government and public behaviour is resolved. The absence of complete credibility of government policy and intransigence of private sector wage demands increase the output loss of disinflation. The analysis also sheds light on the strategic nature of economic policymaking and the role of information in macroeconomics.

The general question of forest management can be stated as follows. Suppose the planner of a piece of forest land obtains utility in any time period from the timber content of trees harvested in that period. If the planner wishes to maximize the discounted sum of such utilities starting from any initial forest, what pattern of planting and harvesting trees should it follow? This paper provides a systematic analysis to answer the above question. In particular, the optimal solution is related to the Faustmann periodic solution and the sustained yield solution, which are prominent in the forestry literature.

This paper develops a model of "large group" Chamberlinian monopolistic competition in which (1) there are many firms producing differentiated commodities, (2) each firm is negligible in that it can ignore its impact on, and hence reactions from, other firms; (3) free entry leads to zero profit of operating firms; but (4) each firm faces a downward-sloping demand curve. The existence of a monopolistically competitive equilibrium is established. In a companion paper, more particular questions such as whether the market provides too many or too few products are addressed for a special case of the model.

We present some examples of Nash equilibria that are independent of the distribution of some parameter across the economic agents and describe a general theorem that characterizes this phenomenon.

Equilibrium price distributions (for a homogeneous product) consistent with individual incentives are investigated. They arise in informationally imperfect markets in which the only primitive datum is the distribution of search costs. It is shown that single, multi- and continuous price distributions are all viable long-run phenomena depending on the nature of search costs. A method for computing equilibrium price distributions is also provided.