Knowledge that Transforms

Abstract This paper incorporates diagnostic expectations into a general equilibrium macroeconomic model with a financial intermediary sector. Diagnostic expectations are a forward-looking model of extrapolative expectations that overreact to recent news. Frictions in financial intermediation produce non-linear spikes in risk premia and slumps in investment during periods of financial distress. The interaction of sentiment with financial frictions generates a short-run amplification effect followed by a long-run reversal effect, termed the feedback from behavioural frictions to financial frictions. The model features sentiment-driven financial crises characterized by low pre-crisis risk premia and neglected risk. The conflicting short-run and long-run effect of sentiment produces boom–bust investment cycles. The model also identifies a stabilizing role for diagnostic expectations. Under the baseline calibration, financial crises are less likely to occur when expectations are diagnostic than when they are rational.

Abstract Fears of immigrants as a threat to public health have a long and sordid history. At the turn of the 20th century, when immigrants made up one-third of the population in crowded American cities, contemporaries blamed high urban mortality rates on the newest arrivals. We evaluate how the implementation of country-specific immigration quotas in the 1920s affected urban health. Cities with larger quota-induced reductions in immigration experienced a persistent decline in mortality rates, driven by a reduction in deaths from infectious diseases. The unfavourable living conditions immigrants endured explains the majority of the effect as quotas reduced residential crowding and mortality declines were largest in cities where immigrants resided in more crowded conditions and where public health resources were stretched thinnest.

Abstract The strategic importance of commitment in bargaining is widely acknowledged. Yet disentangling its role from key features of canonical models, such as proposal power and reputational concerns, is difficult. This paper introduces a model of bargaining with strategic commitment at its core. Following Schelling (1956, The American Economic Review, vol. 46, 281–306), commitment ability stems from the costly nature of concession and is endogenously determined by players’ demands. Agreement is immediate for familiar bargainers, modelled via renegotiation-proofness. The unique prediction at the high concession cost limit provides a strategic foundation for the Kalai bargaining solution. Equilibria with delay feature a form of gradualism in demands.

Abstract In the late nineteenth century, the North American bison was brought to the brink of extinction in less than two decades. We demonstrate that the loss of the bison had immediate, negative consequences for the Native Americans who relied on them and ultimately resulted in a persistent reversal of fortunes. Once amongst the tallest people in the world, the generations of bison-reliant people born after the slaughter lost their entire height advantage. By the early twentieth century, child mortality was 16 percentage points higher and the probability of reporting an occupation 19 percentage points lower in bison nations compared with nations that were never reliant on the bison. Throughout the latter half of the twentieth century and into the present, income per capita has remained 25% lower, on average, for bison nations. This persistent gap cannot be explained by differences in agricultural productivity, self-governance, or application of the Dawes Act. We provide evidence that this historical shock altered the dynamic path of development for formerly bison-reliant nations. We demonstrate that limited access to credit constrained the ability of bison nations to adjust through re-specialization and migration.

Abstract Libor is an estimate of interbank borrowing costs computed daily from rates reported by a fixed panel of banks. Evidence suggests that banks have manipulated Libor in recent years by misreporting their borrowing costs. I estimate a strategic reporting model that identifies banks’ borrowing costs as well as their motives for misreporting. The estimation places a lower bound on the value that Libor would have had if banks had truthfully reported their borrowing costs. The model is identified even when unobserved heterogeneity exists in the form of a common cost component that is known by all banks but unobservable to the econometrician and is allowed to follow a non-stationary process. The only data used for identification are banks’ Libor quotes. Overall, I find that the estimated lower bound for the unmanipulated Libor is always above the published Libor, with an average deviation of 25 basis points at the worst of the financial crisis of 2007–2008. The estimated bound displays a pattern similar to two other measures of interbank borrowing costs that have been used previously to assess the extent of manipulation. The model is also used to determine the extent to which misreporting was motivated by signalling or banks’ net exposure to Libor. The estimation results indicate that sending creditworthiness signals was the main driver of systematic misreporting from 2007 to 2010.

Abstract In markets for indivisible resources such as workers and objects, subsidy and taxation for an agent may depend on the set of acquired resources and prices. This paper investigates how such transfer policies interfere with the substitutes condition, which is critical for market equilibrium existence and auction mechanism performance among other important issues. For environments where the condition holds in the absence of policy intervention, we investigate which transfer policies preserve the substitutes condition in various economically meaningful settings, establishing a series of characterisation theorems. For environments where the condition may fail without policy intervention, we examine how to use transfer policies to re-establish it, finding exactly when transfer policies based on scales are effective for that purpose. These results serve to inform policymakers, market designers, and market participants of how transfer policies may impact markets, so more informed decisions can be made.

Abstract We study policy experimentation in organizations with endogenous membership. An organization decides when to stop a policy experiment based on its results. As information arrives, agents update their beliefs, and enter or leave the organization based on their expected flow payoffs. Unsuccessful experiments make all agents more pessimistic, but also drive out conservative members. We identify sufficient conditions under which the latter effect dominates, leading to excessive experimentation. In fact, the organization may experiment forever in the face of mounting negative evidence. Ex post heterogeneous payoffs exacerbate the problem, as optimists can join forces with guaranteed winners. Control by shareholders who own all future payoffs, however, can have a corrective effect. Our results contrast with models of collective experimentation with fixed membership, in which under-experimentation is the typical outcome.

Abstract A widely held view is that small firms in developing countries are prevented from making profitable investments by lack of access to credit and insurance markets. One solution is to provide repayment flexibility in credit contracts. Repayment flexibility eases both the credit constraint, as it allows for increased spending during the start-up phase, and offers insurance, in case of fluctuations in income. In a field experiment among traditional microfinance clients and larger collateralized borrowers in Bangladesh, we randomly assign the option to delay up to 2 monthly repayments at any point during a 12-month loan cycle. The flexible contract leads to substantial improvements in the traditional microfinance clients’ business outcomes, driven by borrowers in the upper tail of the distribution. In addition, we find a significant impact on socio-economic status, combined with lower default rates. We show theoretically and empirically that these effects are induced by an increase in entrepreneurial risk taking, implying that the primary mechanism is insurance provision. Repayment flexibility also attracts less risk-averse borrowers interested in business expansion. At the same time, the effects for the larger loan are much more modest. Our findings suggest that lack of insurance is an important constraint for small firms but that a simple financial product that increases repayment flexibility can be an effective tool for enabling enterprise growth.

Abstract We present an experimental framework to study the extent to which failures of contingent thinking explain classic anomalies in a broad class of environments, including overbidding in auctions and the Ellsberg paradox. We study environments in which the subject’s choices affect payoffs only in some states but not in others. We find that anomalies are in large part driven by incongruences between choices in the standard presentation of each problem and a “contingent” presentation, which focuses the subject on the set of states where her actions matter. Additional evidence suggests that this phenomenon is in large part driven by people’s failure to put themselves in states that have not yet happened even though they are made aware that their actions only matter in those states.

Abstract We analyse efficient risk-sharing arrangements when the value from deviating is determined endogenously by another risk-sharing arrangement. Coalitions form to insure against idiosyncratic income risk. Self-enforcing contracts for both the original coalition and any coalition formed (joined) after deviations rely on a belief in future cooperation which we term “trust”. We treat the contracting conditions of original and deviation coalitions symmetrically and show that higher trust tightens incentive constraints since it facilitates the formation of deviating coalitions. As a consequence, although trust facilitates the initial formation of coalitions, the extent of risk sharing in successfully formed coalitions is declining in the extent of trust and efficient allocations might feature resource burning or utility burning: trust is indeed a double-edged sword.