Knowledge that Transforms

We use novel, large-scale data on 17.5 million Americans to study how a policy-driven increase in economic resources affects children's long-term outcomes. Using the 2000 Census and 2001-13 American Community Survey linked to the Social Security Administration's NUMIDENT, we leverage the county-level rollout of the Food Stamps program between 1961 and 1975. We find that children with access to greater economic resources before age five have better outcomes as adults. The treatment-on-the-treated effects show a 6% of a standard deviation improvement in human capital, 3% of a standard deviation increase in economic self-sufficiency, 8% of a standard deviation increase in the quality of neighbourhood of residence, a 1.2-year increase in life expectancy, and a 0.5 percentage-point decrease in likelihood of being incarcerated. These estimates suggest that Food Stamps' transfer of resources to families is a highly cost-effective investment in young children, yielding a marginal value of public funds of approximately sixty-two.

We use customs data for Irish firms to show that in successful episodes of export market entry, there are statistically and economically significant post-entry dynamics of quantities, but not of mark-ups. To match these moments, we structurally estimate a model where firms can invest in future customer base through two channels: by selling more today, and by spending on marketing and advertising. Our estimates suggest that customer base is insensitive to lagged sales, so firms have no incentive to engage in dynamic pricing to accumulate customers. Instead, investment in customer base through marketing and advertising explains the dynamics of quantities. The ratio of advertising and marketing expenditures to sales implied by the model is consistent with data from other sources. Our estimated model generates long-run export responses to permanent tariff changes that are bigger than short run responses, as well as responses that are increasing in the expected persistence of tariff shocks, contributing to our understanding of the International Elasticity Puzzle.

This paper examines whether monetary policy pass-through to mortgage interest rates affects household fertility decisions. Our empirical strategy exploits variation in households’ eligibility for a rate adjustment, coupled with the large reductions in the monetary policy rate that occurred during the Great Recession in the U.K. and U.S. We estimate that each one percentage point drop in the policy rate increased birth rates amongst households eligible for a rate adjustment by 3%. Our results provide new evidence on the nature of monetary policy transmission to households and suggest a new mechanism via which mortgage contract structures can affect both aggregate demand and supply.

We study the problem of a seller (e.g. a bank) who is privately informed about the quality of her asset and wants to exploit gains from trade with uninformed buyers (e.g. investors) by issuing securities backed by her asset cash flows. In our setting, buyers post menus of contracts to screen the seller, but the seller cannot commit to trade with only one buyer, i.e. markets are non-exclusive. We show that non-exclusive markets behave very differently from exclusive ones: (1) separating contracts are never part of equilibrium; (2) mispricing of claims faced by the seller is always greater than in exclusive markets; (3) there is always a semi-pooling equilibrium where all sellers issue the same debt contract priced at average-valuation, and sellers of low-quality assets issue remaining cash flows at low-valuation; (4) market liquidity can be higher or lower than in exclusive markets, but (5) the average quality of originated assets is always lower. Our model’s predictions are consistent with empirical evidence on the issuance and pricing of mortgage-backed securities, and we use the theory to evaluate recent reforms aimed at enhancing transparency and exclusivity in markets.

We examine two key channels through which commodity price super-cycles affect the economy: a wealth channel, through which higher commodity prices increase domestic demand, and a cost channel, through which they induce wage increases. By exploiting regional variation in exposure to commodity price shocks and administrative firm-level data from Brazil, we empirically disentangle these transmission channels. We introduce a dynamic model with heterogeneous firms and workers to further quantify the mechanisms and evaluate welfare. A counterfactual economy in which commodity booms are purely endowment shocks experiences only 30% of the intersectoral labour reallocation between tradables and nontradables, and 40% of the within-tradable labour reallocation between domestic and exported production. Finally, the consumption-equivalent welfare gain of a commodity super-cycle is twice as large in the counterfactual economy.

We develop a framework for difference-in-differences designs with staggered treatment adoption and heterogeneous causal effects. We show that conventional regression-based estimators fail to provide unbiased estimates of relevant estimands absent strong restrictions on treatment-effect homogeneity. We then derive the efficient estimator addressing this challenge, which takes an intuitive “imputation” form when treatment-effect heterogeneity is unrestricted. We characterize the asymptotic behaviour of the estimator, propose tools for inference, and develop tests for identifying assumptions. Our method applies with time-varying controls, in triple-difference designs, and with certain non-binary treatments. We show the practical relevance of our results in a simulation study and an application. Studying the consumption response to tax rebates in the U.S., we find that the notional marginal propensity to consume is between 8 and 11% in the first quarter—about half as large as benchmark estimates used to calibrate macroeconomic models—and predominantly occurs in the first month after the rebate.

We design a laboratory experiment to study bargaining behaviour when negotiations involve multiple issues. Parties must discover both trading prices and agreement scopes, giving rise to unexplored information structures and bargaining strategies. We find that bargainers often trade the efficient set of issues despite lacking information about individual aspects. However, beneficial agreements critically hinge on integrated negotiations that allow deals on bundles of issues. Moreover, access to more information boosts agreement rates in small-surplus negotiations but can also backfire as it triggers increased risk-taking and conflicting fairness preferences in large-surplus negotiations. Finally, successful negotiations display a specific bargaining convention that emerges endogenously. It involves alternating offers that meet the other side’s most recent demand halfway.

I develop a directed technical change model of economic growth and energy efficiency in order to study the impact of climate change mitigation policies on energy use. I show that the standard Cobb–Douglas production function used in the environmental macroeconomics literature overstates the reduction in cumulative energy use that can be achieved with a given path of energy taxes. I also show that, in the model, the government combines energy taxes with research and development (R&D) policy that favors output-increasing technology—rather than energy efficiency technology—to maximize welfare subject to a constraint on cumulative energy use. In addition, I study energy use dynamics following sudden improvements in energy efficiency. Exogenous shocks that increase energy efficiency also decrease the incentive for subsequent energy efficiency R&D and increase long-run energy use relative to a world without the original shock. Subsidies for energy efficiency R&D, however, permanently alter R&D incentives and decrease long-run energy use.

We study an economy with traders whose payoffs are quasilinear and whose private signals are informative about an unobserved state parameter. The limit economy has infinitely many traders partitioned into a finite set of symmetry classes called types. Market mechanisms in a class that includes auctions yield the same outcome as the Walrasian rational expectations equilibrium if and only if the efficient allocation has a monotonicity property. Examples illustrate cases where they differ. Monotonicity restricts the heterogeneity among traders’ types.

This article explores the relationship between the duration of a vacancy and the starting wage of a new job, using linked data on vacancies, the posting establishments, and the workers eventually filling the vacancies. The unique combination of large-scale, administrative worker, establishment, and vacancy data is critical for separating establishment- and job-level determinants of vacancy duration from worker-level heterogeneity. Conditional on observables, we find that vacancy duration is negatively correlated with the starting wage and its establishment component, with precisely estimated elasticities of −0.07 and −0.21, respectively. While the negative relationship is qualitatively consistent with search-theoretic models where firms use the wage as a recruiting device, these elasticities are small, suggesting that firms’ wage policies can account only for a small fraction of the variation in vacancy filling across establishments.