Knowledge that Transforms

This paper describes a class of consistent estimators for short panels with fixed effects. The method is to find an orthogonal reparametrization of the fixed effects and then to integrate the new effects from the likelihood with respect to an appropriately chosen prior density. The resulting marginal posterior densities of the common parameters have modes that are shown to be consistent in the models examined here. The main result concerns the first-order autoregressive model with agent specific intercepts where the likelihood is conditional on the set of initial observations. This paper provides a consistent likelihoodbased estimator for this model. Some numerical illustrations are given. The first-order conditions for the posterior mode can also be thought of as new moment conditions for GMM estimation. Copyright 2002, Wiley-Blackwell.

This paper investigates the role of campaign advertising and the opportunity of legal restrictions on it. An electoral race is modeled as a signalling game with three classes of players: many voters, two candidates, and one interest group. The group has non-verifiable insider information on the candidates ’ quality and, on the basis of this information, offers a contribution to each candidate in exchange for a favorable policy position. Candidates spend the contributions they receive on non-directly informative advertising. This paper shows that: (1) A separating equilibrium exists in which the group contributes to a candidate only if the insider information about that candidate is positive; (2) Although voters are fully rational, a ban on campaign advertising can be welfare-improving; and (3) Split contributions may arise in equilibrium (and, if they arise too often, they are detrimental to voters).

For many problems in macroeconomics, development economics, labour economics, and international trade, whether technical change is biased towards particular factors is of central importance. This paper develops a simple framework to analyse the forces that shape these biases. There are two major forces affecting equilibrium bias: the price effect and the market size effect. While the former encourages innovations directed at scarce factors, the latter leads to technical change favouring abundant factors. The elasticity of substitution between different factors regulates how powerful these effects are, determining how technical change and factor prices respond to changes in relative supplies. If the elasticity of substitution is sufficiently large, the long run relative demand for a factor can slope up.I apply this framework to develop possible explanations to the following questions: why technical change over the past 60 years was skill biased, and why the skill bias may have accelerated over the past 25 years? Why new technologies introduced during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were unskill biased? What is the effect of biased technical change on the income gap between rich and poor countries? Does international trade affect the skill bias of technical change? What are the implications of wage push for technical change? Why is technical change generally labour augmenting rather than capital augmenting? Copyright 2002, Wiley-Blackwell.

This paper presents a framework for the evaluation and measurement of “reversal” and “origin independence” as separate aspects of economic mobility. We show that evaluation depends on aversion to multi-period inequality, aversion to inter-temporal fluctuations, and aversion to future risk. We construct “extended Atkinson indices” that allow us to quantify the relative impact of reversal and origin independence on welfare. We apply our approach to the comparison of income mobility in Germany and in the U.S.. When aversion to inequality is the only consideration, the U.S. gains more from mobility than Germany. This reflects similar gains from reversal in the two countries but greater gains in the U.S. from origin independence. The introduction of aversion to intertemporal fluctuations and aversion to future risk makes the impact of mobility in the two countries more similar.

We study frictionless matching in large economies with and without market imperfections, providing sufficient conditions for monotone matching that are weaker than those previously known. Necessary conditions, which depend on a key analytical object we call the surplus function, are also offered. Changes in the surplus yield valuable information about the comparative statics of matching patterns across environments. We apply our framework to some examples adapted from the literature, accounting for and extending several comparative-static and welfare results. We also explore the dependence of the matching pattern on the type distribution.

We introduce firm heterogeneity into the standard monopolistically competitive real business cycle (RBC) model. The fundamental equilibrium path is derived and the time-series properties of aggregate GDP are studied analytically. Although firms' productivities are subject to temporary shocks, the aggregate process displays a surprising novel form of nonlinearity and long memory which had not been built into the model at the outset. This aggregate GDP turns out to have very different properties from log-linear time-series models such as auto-regressive (AR) models and their extensions. It displays very strong persistence, which ends abruptly with a sudden change of tendency, giving its autocorrelation function (ACF) an S-shape. Although persistent, it is mean-reverting, unlike the everlasting memory of unit-root processes. Its volatility is of a greater order of magnitude than that of any of its components, so small micro-shocks can generate large macro fluctuations. It is also characterized by long, asymmetric cycles of random lengths. Increased monopoly power tends to reduce the amplitude and increase the persistence of business cycles. Strikingly, we find that the empirical ACFs constructed from GDP data for the U.K. and the U.S. display this characteristic S-shape.

We analyse the optimal Initial Public Offering (IPO) mechanism in a multidimensional adverse selection setting where institutional investors have private information about the market valuation of the shares, the intermediary has private information about the demand, and the institutional investors and intermediary collude. Theorem 1 states that uniform pricing is optimal (all agents pay the same price) and characterizes the IPO price in terms of conditional expectations. Theorem 2 states that the optimal mechanism can be implemented by a non-linear price schedule decreasing in the quantity allocated to retail investors. This is similar to IPO procedures used in the U.K. and France. Relying on French IPO data we perform a GMM structural estimation and test of the model. The price schedule is estimated and the conditions characterizing the optimal mechanism are not rejected.

Abstract. Theapproximatee®ectsofmeasurementerroronavarietyof measures ofinequality and poverty are derived. They are shown to depend on themeasurementerrorvarianceandfunctionalsoftheerrorcontaminatedincome distribution. Sincethesefunctionalscanbeestimateditispossibletoinvestigate the sensitivity ofwelfare measures to alternative amounts ofmeasurementerror and,whenanestimateofthemeasurementerrorvarianceisavailable,tocalculate corrected welfare measures. The methods are illustrated in an application using Indonesianhouseholdexpendituredata. Key W ords:inequalitymeasurement,povertyindices,measurementerror.

Markets with rigid labour regulations and centralized wage setting are often thought to be inefficient but egalitarian. Using a model of off- and on-the-job search and event-history, individual-level data for Italy and the U.S., we show that while the cross-sectional wage distributions of young Italian males are much more compressed than are the comparable distributions for young white U.S. males, the estimated search model implies that the distribution of lifetime welfare is no more disperse in the U.S. than it is in Italy. Our model implies that the high frequency of movements between labour market states leads to both a relatively equitable distribution of "long run" welfare in the U.S. and a high level of cross-sectional inequality.