Knowledge that Transforms

In this paper we discuss Hicksian demand and compensating variation in the context of discrete choice. We first derive Hicksian choice probabilities and the distribution of the (random) expenditure function in the general case when the utilities are nonlinear in income. We subsequently derive exact and simple formulae for the expenditure and choice probabilities under price (policy) changes conditional on the initial utility level. This is of particular interest for welfare measurement because it enables the researcher to compute the distribution of compensating variation in a simple way. We also derive formulae for the joint distribution of expenditure, the choice before and after a policy change has been introduced.

We provide an ascending auction that yields an efficient outcome when there are many identical units for sale and bidders have interdependent values and downward-sloping demand. Our ascending auction both extends and generalizes Ausubel's (2004) and yields the same outcome as Perry and Reny's (2002) generalization of Vickrey's (1961) sealed-bid auction. There are two key features of our auction. Bidders are permitted both to express different demands against different bidders, as well as to increase their demands. The equilibrium strategies are closely related to the familiar “drop out when price equals value” strategy of the English auction.

This paper estimates a life cycle model of labour supply, retirement, and savings behaviour in which future health status and wages are uncertain. Individuals face a fixed cost of work and cannot borrow against future labour, pension, or Social Security income. The method of simulated moments is used to match the life cycle profiles of labour force participation, hours worked, and assets that are estimated from the data to those that are generated by the model. The model establishes that the tax structure of the Social Security system and pensions are key determinants of the high observed job exit rates at ages 62 and 65. Removing the tax wedge embedded in the Social Security earnings test for individuals aged 65 and older would delay job exit by almost one year. By contrast, Social Security benefit levels, health, and borrowing constraints are less important determinants of job exit at older ages. For example, reducing Social Security benefits by 20% would cause workers to delay exit from the labour force by only three months.

When credit markets to finance investment in human capital are missing, the competitive equilibrium allocation is inefficient. When generations overlap, this failure can be mitigated by properly designed social arrangements. We show that public financing of education and public pensions can be designed to implement an intergenerational transfer scheme supporting the complete market allocation. Neither the public financing of education nor the pension scheme we consider resemble standard ones. In our mechanism, via the public education system, the young borrow from the middle aged to invest in human capital. They pay back the debt via a social security tax, the proceedings of which finance pension payments. When the complete market allocation is achieved, the rate of return implicit in this borrowing-lending scheme should equal the market rate of return.

I undertake a quantitative investigation into the short run effects of changes in the timing of proportional income taxes for model economies in which heterogeneous households face a borrowing constraint. Temporary tax changes are found to have large real effects. In the benchmark model, a temporary tax cut increases aggregate consumption on impact by around 29 cents for every dollar of tax revenue lost. Comparing the benchmark incomplete-markets model to a complete-markets economy, income tax cuts provide a larger boost to consumption and a smaller investment stimulus when asset markets are incomplete. Copyright 2005, Wiley-Blackwell.

We study the problem of parameter inference in (possibly non-linear and non-smooth) econometric models when the data are measured with error. We allow for arbitrary correlation between the true variables and the measurement errors. To solve the identification problem, we require the existence of an auxiliary data-set that contains information about the conditional distribution of the true variables given the mismeasured variables. Our main assumption requires that the conditional distribution of the true variables given the mismeasured variables is the same in the primary and auxiliary data. Our methods allow the auxiliary data to be a validation sample, where the primary and validation data are from the same distribution, and more importantly, a stratified sample where the auxiliary data-set is not from the same distribution as the primary data. We also show how to combine the two data-sets to obtain a more efficient estimator of the parameter of interest. We establish the large sample properties of the sieve based estimators under verifiable conditions. In particular, we allow for the mismeasured variables to have unbounded supports without employing the tedious trimming scheme typically used in kernel based methods. We illustrate our methods by estimating a returns to schooling censored quantile regression using the CPS/SSR 1978 exact match files where the dependent variable is measured with error of arbitrary kind.

We characterize infrequent durables stock adjustment by consumers who also derive utility from non-durable consumption flows in the presence of idiosyncratic income uncertainty. The data we analyse include subjective future income uncertainty measures, which we use as instruments in the estimation of relevant parameters of heterogeneous consumers' dynamic adjustment problems. The data feature two conceptually distinct sources of variation: cross-sectional heterogeneity of the sampled households' dynamic problems, and history-dependent heterogeneity in their situation during the observation period. We note that the latter should affect the likelihood but not the size of stock adjustment decisions, and find broad support for theoretical predictions in formal selection-controlled regressions based on this insight.

We discuss a class of markets for durable goods where efficiency (or approximate efficiency) is obtained despite the presence of information asymmetries. In the model, the number of times a good has changed hands (the vintage of the good) is an accurate signal of its quality, each consumer self-selects into obtaining the vintage that the social planner would have assigned to her, and consumers' equilibrium trading behaviour in secondary markets is not subject to adverse selection. We show that producers have the incentive to choose contracts that lead to the efficient allocation, and to supply the efficient output. We also provide a contrast between leasing contracts, resale contracts, and different kinds of rental contracts. Resale contracts do not lead to the efficient allocation. A specific kind of rental contract provides the appropriate incentives to consumers.

Using data from the Mid-Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog fishery, we find that firms with a preference for extreme, rather than moderate, policies are much more likely to participate in public meetings where regulation is determined. We also find that participation rates are higher for larger, closer, and more influential firms. These results: (1) improve our understanding of a very common institution for resource allocation, “meetings with costly participation”, (2) they refine our intuition about regulatory capture, (3) they provide broad confirmation of the recent theoretical literature predicting that polarization and bipartisanship should emerge under a variety of democratic institutions, and finally, (4) they may help to explain management problems in U.S. fisheries.

Recent efforts to restructure electricity markets have renewed interest in assessing how consumers respond to price changes. This paper develops a model for evaluating the effects of alternative tariff designs on electricity use. The model concurrently addresses several interrelated difficulties posed by nonlinear pricing, heterogeneity in consumer price sensitivity, and consumption aggregation over appliances and time. We estimate the model using extensive data for a representative sample of 1300 California households. The results imply a strikingly skewed distribution of household electricity price elasticities in the population, with a small fraction of households accounting for most aggregate demand response. We then estimate the aggregate and distributional consequences of recent tariff structure changes in California, the consumption effects of which have been the subject of considerable debate.