This paper presents an experimental study of a computerized “posted-offer” pricing mechanism that captures many of the basic institutional features of retail exchange in the U.S. Posted-offer market performance is evaluated relative to “double-auction” market performance using two supply and demand designs. Subject experience with the trading mechanism is explicitly considered as an experimental treatment variable. The market data suggest that prices tend to be higher and efficiency lower under posted-offer pricing relative to double auction. However, the institutional effect appears to interact with other design conditions. When feasible, the predictive power of competitive, Nash, and limit-price theoretic equilibria are empirically evaluated.

An econometric methodology is proposed for reconciling inaccurate measures of latent data which are subject to accounting constraints. The method deals with the case in which the measurement errors are serially correlated, generalizing previous contributions. A class of efficient estimators are derived for the latent data. Consistent estimators for the weight matrices applied to the observed information based on a linear regression procedure are obtained together with confidence interval estimators for these weight matrices. Approximate confidence intervals are suggested for the latent data themselves together with specification tests for the assumptions underlying the procedure. An application of the proposed method is made to U.K. Gross Domestic Product in constant prices for 1958Q1–1989Q4.

The conventional approach to social programme evaluation focuses on estimating mean impacts of programmes. Yet many interesting questions regarding the political economy of programmes, the distribution of programme benefits and the option values conferred on programme participants require knowledge of the distribution of impacts, or features of it. This paper presents evidence that heterogeneity in response to programmes is empirically important and that classical probability inequalities are not very informative in producing estimates or bounds on the distribution of programme impacts. We explore two methods for supplementing the information in these inequalities based on assumptions about participant decision-making processes and about the strength in dependence between outcomes in the participation and non-participation states. Dependence is produced as a consequence of rational choice by participants. We test for stochastic rationality among programme participants and present and implement methods for estimating the option values of social programmes.