Knowledge that Transforms

This paper demonstrates, using the Reflection Principle, the existence and uniqueness of the solution to the classic Solow equation under continuous time uncertainty for the class of strictly concave production functions which are continuously differentiable on the nonnegative real numbers. This class contains all CES functions with elasticity of substitution less than unity. A steady state distribution also exists for this class of production functions which have a bounded slope at the origin. A condition on the drift-variance ratio of the stochastic differential equation alone, independent of technology and the savings ratio, is found to be necessary for the existence of a steady state.

This paper explores the role of testing in models of asymmetric information. We demonstrate conditions under which testing for underlying characteristics can overcome adverse selection problems and lead to a full-information competitive equilibrium. This paper provides a more general statement of Mirrlees result on the optimal use of infinite fines. Where testing cannot fully resolve the problems associated with asymmetric information, we outline the source of the difficulties. Our results, developed in the context of a labour market, can be directly extended to other environments. In problems with asymmetric information, testing to discover an agent's chosen action or underlying characteristics may significantly reduce the cost of moral hazard and adverse selection.

Most results in what can be termed the comparative statics of risk aversion are obtained when there is only one source of uncertainty. The primary example (which originally motivated the definition of risk aversion) is that more risk averse people are willing to pay a higher premium for insuring against risk. It is known that the results do not generally carry over when there is another source of uncertainty. The paper develops conditions under which comparative statics results are robust against the introduction of additional sources of uncertainty.

The authors analyze a dynamic North-South model of innovation, technology transfer, and trade. Northern firms conduct R&D using labor, which has alternative uses producing in the R&D sector or a nontraded good sector. Since technology trans fer prevents the North from fully appropriating benefits of R&D, the optimal rate of innovation for either profit-maximizing firms or a ut ility-maximizing northern planner is less than globally optimal. An i nceased transfer rate intensifies competition of lower wage southern workers with northern workers in production, so profit-maximizing Nor thern firms reallocate labor toward R&D. Copyright 1987 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.

This paper examines testing for AR(1) disturbances against MA(1) disturbances in the linear regression model. A Monte Carlo experiment compares the small-sample properties of the Cox test, some linearized Cox tests, and an approximate point optimal test, as well as a Lagrange multiplier test of AR (1) disturbances against ARM A (1,1) disturbances. The main findings are that the true sizes of the asymptotic non-nested tests can differ considerably from their nominal sizes, the Lagrange multiplier test's sizes are reasonably accurate and the point optimal test is generally more powerful than the other tests when appropriate critical values are used. When sizes are controlled at an arbitrary value of the AR (1) parameter, the relative power of the Cox test is increased substantially.

This paper analyses a bargaining model with incomplete information in which the time between offers is an endogenous strategic variable. We find equilibria involving a delay to agreement that is due to the use of strategic time delay by bargainers to signal their relative strength. Under some specifications of the parameters, delay is present in the unique sequential equilibrium whose beliefs satisfy one intuitive restriction. This delay does not vanish as the minimal time between offers becomes small.

The relationship between economic welfare and the number of firms in a quasi-Cournot market is examined. In the first place, we presuppose the existence of a strong (“first-best”) government that can enforce the marginal-cost principle to the firms along with regulating the number of firms. It is shown that there exist excessive number of firms at the free-entry quasi-Cournot equilibrium vis-à-vis the “first-best” welfare maximizing number of firms. The thrust of this result essentially survives even if we replace a Utopian “first-best” government by a “second-best” government that leaves the firms to pursue their respective profit maximization freely and engages solely in regulating the number of firms. It can be shown that the excess entry prevails again in this “second-best” world.