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Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms1

Review of Economic Studies 2006 73(4), 1085-1111
This paper establishes that posting a price in each period is a revenue-maximizing allocation mechanism in a finite period model without commitment. A risk-neutral seller has one object to sell and faces a risk-neutral buyer whose valuation is private information and drawn from an arbitrary bounded subset of the real line. The seller has all the bargaining power: she designs a mechanism to sell the object at t, but if trade does not occur at t she can propose another mechanism at t + 1. We show that posting a price in each period is an optimal mechanism. A methodological contribution of the paper is to develop a procedure to characterize optimal dynamic incentive schemes under non-commitment that is valid irrespective of the structure of the agent's type.

Forecasting Time Series Subject to Multiple Structural Breaks

Review of Economic Studies 2006 73(4), 1057-1084 open access
This paper provides a new approach to forecasting time series that are subject to discrete structural breaks. We propose a Bayesian estimation and prediction procedure that allows for the possibility of new breaks occurring over the forecast horizon, taking account of the size and duration of past breaks (if any) by means of a hierarchical hidden Markov chain model. Predictions are formed by integrating over the parameters from the meta-distribution that characterizes the stochastic break-point process. In an application to U.S. Treasury bill rates, we find that the method leads to better out-of-sample forecasts than a range of alternative methods.

On the Origins of Property Rights: Conflict and Productionin the State of Nature

Review of Economic Studies 2006 73(1), 119-143
I analyse the emergence of property rights in a model of conflict and production in the absence of institutions of enforcement. The population of agents evolves dynamically through conflicts for possession of factor goods among pairs of randomly matched agents. Conflicts are incomplete information wars of attrition with an agent's type consisting of his or her independently drawn valuation of the prize and cost of competing for it. I prove equilibrium existence and show that in the steady state of the game, the population sorts into two stable groups (resource “haves” and “have-nots”) in accordance with a known function of their primitive types.