Knowledge that Transforms

Journal Article Evaluation of Public Projects under Optimal Taxation Get access Vidar Christiansen Vidar Christiansen Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Bergen Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 48, Issue 3, July 1981, Pages 447–457, https://doi.org/10.2307/2297157 Published: 01 July 1981 Article history Received: 01 July 1979 Accepted: 01 November 1980 Published: 01 July 1981

Journal Article Fiscal Policy, Inflation and the Accumulation of Risky Capital Get access Jonathan Eaton Jonathan Eaton Princeton University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 48, Issue 3, July 1981, Pages 435–445, https://doi.org/10.2307/2297156 Published: 01 July 1981 Article history Received: 01 December 1977 Accepted: 01 October 1980 Published: 01 July 1981

Journal Article Heterogeneous Labour and the Fundamental Marxian Theorem Get access Ulrich Krause Ulrich Krause University of Bremen Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 48, Issue 1, January 1981, Pages 173–178, https://doi.org/10.2307/2297130 Published: 01 January 1981 Article history Received: 01 June 1979 Accepted: 01 June 1980 Published: 01 January 1981

Part of the "conventional wisdom " on the subject of the size distribution of earnings is that earnings are approximately lognormal, but with an upper tail which is better described by the Pareto function. 1 The primary purpose of this paper is to re-examine these propositions, using British New Earnings Survey data disaggregated by occupational groups. We have several reasons for feeling that such a re-examination is timely. First, most previous studies have considered the distribution among all employees, while theoretical considerations suggest that disaggregated data might be more appropriate. We elaborate this point in Section 1 of the paper. Second, the method of estimating the parameters of the Pareto and lognormal functions has not always been given the attention it deserves. In Section 2 we address this issue, and also refer briefly to the related one of goodness of fit. The remainder of the paper presents parameter estimates for the Pareto and lognormal functions, using first aggregate data (Section 3), and then distributions within occupational groups (Section 4). Section 5 compares these two sets of results, and at the

Journal Article Spatial Competition and Spatial Price Discrimination Get access George Norman George Norman University of Reading Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 48, Issue 1, January 1981, Pages 97–111, https://doi.org/10.2307/2297123 Published: 01 January 1981 Article history Received: 01 October 1979 Accepted: 01 May 1980 Published: 01 January 1981

Charles Blackorby, R. Robert Russell; The Morishima Elasticity of Substitution; Symmetry, Constancy, Separability, and its Relationship to the Hicks and Al

Journal Article Duality Theory and Functional Forms for Dynamic Factor Demands Get access Larry G. Epstein Larry G. Epstein University of Toronto Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 48, Issue 1, January 1981, Pages 81–95, https://doi.org/10.2307/2297122 Published: 01 January 1981 Article history Received: 01 July 1979 Accepted: 01 August 1980 Published: 01 January 1981

Jess Benhabib, Richard H. Day; Rational Choice and Erratic Behaviour, The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 48, Issue 3, 1 July 1981, Pages 459–471, https://do

Slayton and Treblicock (1978)), the formal analysis of the economics of the self-regulating profession has received little attention from theorists. If a profession is self-regulating, in the sense that its current members, being the sole suppliers of a certain type of service, are free to determine, in one way or another, whether or not to admit a potential recruit, then it might seem prima facie that such a profession could simply be regarded as a monopolistic seller of the service in question, so that the effects of self-regulation would appear to involve an unambiguous welfare loss. The whole rationale for self-regulation, however, rests on the notion that it provides a vehicle through which the quality of the service may be maintained in markets where the consumer cannot readily measure this quality himself. It is the analysis of the interplay of these two elements, the enhanced price of such services associated with the monopolistic power of the profession, and the improved quality of the service which may accompany a reduction in supply, which forms the focus of the present paper. It is tempting to begin the analysis of such a profession by first positing some particular

Mark A. Satterthwaite, Hugo Sonnenschein; Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points, The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 48, Issue 4