Banks in low-income countries face severe liquidity risk due to volatile deposits, which destabilize their funding, and dysfunctional liquidity markets, which induce expensive interbank and central bank lending. Such liquidity risk dissuades the transformation of short-term deposits into long-term loans and deters long-term investment. To validate this mechanism, we exploit a Sharia-compliant levy in Pakistan, which generates unintended and quasi-experimental variation in liquidity risk, with data from the credit registry and firm imports. We find that banks with a stronger exposure to liquidity risk lower their supply of long-term finance, which reduces the long-term investment of connected firms.

Government procurement contracts rarely have many bids, often only one. Motivated by the institutional features of federal procurement, this article develops a principal-agent model where a buyer seeks sellers at a cost and negotiates contract terms with them. The model is identified and estimated with data on IT and telecommunications contracts. We find the benefits of drawing additional sellers are significantly reduced because the procurement agency can extract informational rents from sellers. Another factor explaining the small number of bids is that sellers are relatively homogeneous, conditional on observed project attributes. Administrative hurdles and corruption appear to play very limited roles.

Using newly collected data on death rates and aerial victories of more than 5,000 German fighter pilots during World War II, we examine the effects of public recognition on performance and risk-taking. When a particular pilot is honoured publicly, both the victory rate and the death rate of his former peers increase. Fellow pilots react more if they come from the same region of Germany, or if they worked closely with him. Our results suggest that personal rivalry can be a prime motivating force, and that non-financial rewards can lead to a crowd-in of both effort and risk-taking via social connections

Critics claim that patent screening is ineffective, granting low-quality patents that impose unnecessary social costs. We develop an integrated framework, involving patent office examination, fees, and endogenous validity challenges in the courts, to study patent screening both theoretically and quantitatively. In our model, some inventions require the patent incentive while others do not, and asymmetric information creates a need for screening. We show that the endogeneity of challenges implies that courts, even if perfect, cannot solve the screening problem. Simulations of the model, calibrated on U.S. data, indicate that screening is highly imperfect, with almost half of all patents issued on inventions that do not require the patent incentive. While we find that the current patent system generates positive social value, intensifying examination would yield large welfare gains. The social value of the patent system would also be larger if complemented by antitrust limits on licensing.

We use a revealed-preference approach to estimate investor expectations of stock market returns. Using data on demand for index funds that follow the S&P 500, we develop and estimate a model of investor choice to flexibly recover the time-varying distribution of expected future returns across investors. Our analysis is facilitated by the prevalence of leveraged funds that track the same underlying asset: by choosing between higher and lower leverage, investors trade off higher return against less risk. Our estimates indicate that investor expectations are heterogeneous, extrapolative, and persistent. Following a downturn, investors become more pessimistic on average, but there is also an increase in disagreement among participating investors due to the presence of contrarian investors.

This article considers the effect of contracting limitations in risk-sharing networks, arising for example from observability, verifiability, complexity, or cultural constraints. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for Pareto efficiency under these constraints in a general setting, and we provide an explicit characterization of Pareto efficient bilateral transfer profiles under CARA utility and normally distributed endowments. Our model predicts that network centrality is positively correlated with consumption volatility, as more central agents become quasi-insurance providers to more peripheral agents. The proposed framework has important implications for the empirical specification of risk-sharing tests, allowing for local risk-sharing groups that overlap within the village network.

About half of the change in U.S. non-durable consumption expenditure is due to changes in the products entering households’ consumption basket (the extensive margin). Changes in the basket are driven by fluctuations in the rate at which households add products; removals fluctuate little. These patterns reflect that, in response to income increases, households adopt consumer products already available in the market. Household adoption amplifies the effects of fiscal transfers on consumption by more than 30%. Cyclical household adoption of products also implies that inflation measures based on a representative household consuming all varieties available in the market underestimate true household-level inflation by as much as 1% per year over the Great Recession in the consumption categories covered by our data.

We show that the folk theorem holds generically for the repeated two-player game with private monitoring if the support of each player’s signal distribution is sufficiently large. Neither cheap talk communication nor public randomization is necessary.

This article develops a heterogeneous firm-dynamics model to jointly study firms’ currency debt composition and investment choices. In our model, foreign currency borrowing arises from a dynamic trade-off between exposure to currency risk and growth. The model endogenously generates selection of productive firms into foreign currency borrowing. Among them, firms with high marginal product of capital use foreign loans more intensively. We assess econometrically the model’s predicted pattern of foreign currency borrowing using firm-level census data from the deregulation of these loans in Hungary, calibrate the model, and quantify the aggregate impact of this financing. Our counterfactual exercises show that understanding the characteristics of firms borrowing in foreign currency is critical to assess the aggregate consequences of this financing.

Many studies use shift-share (or "Bartik") instruments, which average a set of shocks with exposure share weights. We provide a new econometric framework for shift-share instrumental variable (SSIV) regressions in which identification follows from the quasi-random assignment of shocks, while exposure shares are allowed to be endogenous. The framework is motivated by an equivalence result: the orthogonality between a shift-share instrument and an unobserved residual can be represented as the orthogonality between the underlying shocks and a shock-level unobservable. SSIV regression coefficients can similarly be obtained from an equivalent shock-level regression, motivating shock-level conditions for their consistency. We discuss and illustrate several practical insights of this framework in the setting of Autor et al. (2013), estimating the effect of Chinese import competition on manufacturing employment across U.S. commuting zones.