Journal Article Optimal Redundancy Compensation Get access A. A. Sampson A. A. Sampson University of Sheffield and University of New England Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 45, Issue 3, October 1978, Pages 447–452, https://doi.org/10.2307/2297247 Published: 01 October 1978 Article history Received: 01 December 1976 Accepted: 01 July 1977 Published: 01 October 1978

Journal Article A Three (or More) Factor Model of Growth with Induced Innovation Get access A. A. Brewer A. A. Brewer University of Bristol Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 42, Issue 2, April 1975, Pages 285–292, https://doi.org/10.2307/2296536 Published: 01 April 1975

Journal Article The Accelerator and Technical Progress Get access A. A. Walters A. A. Walters Birmingham Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 30, Issue 1, February 1963, Pages 1–15, https://doi.org/10.2307/2296025 Published: 01 February 1963

This paper examines the role of industry capacity in enforcing collusion in the context of repeated games. For a fixed capacity per firm it is shown that changes in the number of firms have a non-monotone effect on the best enforceable cartel price. This is due to the fact that while an additional firm lowers the share that each of the other firms enjoys at the collusive price it also increases the losses to each firm should the cartel fail.

Jerry A. Hausman, David A. Wise; Discontinuous Budget Constraints and Estimation: The Demand for Housing, The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 47, Issue 1, 1

We study the pricing behaviour of a multiproduct firm, when consumers must pay a search cost to learn its prices. Equilibrium prices are high, because consumers understand that visiting a store exposes them to a hold-up problem. However, a firm with more products charges lower prices, because it attracts consumers who are more price sensitive. Similarly, when a firm advertises a low price on one product, consumers rationally expect it to charge somewhat lower prices on its other products as well. We therefore find that having a large product range, and advertising a low price on one product, are substitute ways of building a “low-price image”. Finally, we show that in a competitive setting each product has a high regular price, with firms occasionally giving random discounts that are positively correlated across products.

This paper investigates how precisely short-term, job-search oriented training programs as opposed to long-term, human capital intensive training programs work. We evaluate and compare their eects on time until job entry, stability of employment, and earnings. Further, we examine the heterogeneity of treatment eects according to the timing of training during unemployment as well as across dierent subgroups of participants. We nd that participating in short-term training reduces the remaining time in unemployment and moderately increases job stability. Long-term training programs initially prolong the remaining time in unemployment, but once the scheduled program end is reached participants exit to employment at a much faster rate than without training. In addition, they benet from substantially more stable employment spells and higher earnings. Overall, long-term training programs are well eective in supporting the occupational advancement of very heterogeneous groups of participants, including those with generally weak labor market prospects. However, from a scal perspective only the low-cost short-term training schemes are cost ecient in the short run.

Administrative and political reorganization is being actively debated even in the mature, stable economies of Western Europe. This paper investigates the possibility that such a reorganization is tied to the integration of economic markets. The paper describes a model where heterogeneous individuals form coalitions for the provision of a public good and shows that the number and composition of these jurisdictions depend on the overall size of the market. The range of economic activities engaged in by jurisdiction members increases when the size of the market increases, and so does the range of their preferences over the public good. The result is a change in the endogenous borders of the jurisdictions, and a reorganization of all coalitions. The optimal number of jurisdictions is unique and increases with market size. In the absence of compensating transfers, however, the decentralized equilibrium need not be optimal and is not unique, although there is no restriction on individuals' ability to coordinate the formation of coalitions. It remains true that a large enough increase in market size will trigger an increase in the number of jurisdictions.

Journal Article The Determinants of Teacher Supply Get access A. Zabalza A. Zabalza London School of Economics Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 46, Issue 1, January 1979, Pages 131–147, https://doi.org/10.2307/2297177 Published: 01 January 1979 Article history Received: 01 April 1977 Accepted: 01 February 1978 Published: 01 January 1979

Journal Article Public Goods and Technology of Consumption: A Comment Get access A. Zabalza A. Zabalza London School of Economics Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 44, Issue 1, February 1977, Pages 193–194, https://doi.org/10.2307/2296987 Published: 01 February 1977 Article history Received: 01 October 1975 Accepted: 01 May 1976 Published: 01 February 1977