To fully understand the motives for delegating a decision right, it is important to study responsibility attributions for outcomes of delegated decisions. We conducted laboratory experiments in which subjects could either choose a fair allocation or an unfair allocation or delegate the choice, and we used a punishment option to elicit responsibility attributions. Our results show that, first, responsibility attribution can be effectively shifted and, second, this can constitute a strong motive for the delegation of a decision right. Moreover, we propose a simple measure of responsibility and show that this measure outperforms measures based on inequity aversion or reciprocity in predicting punishment behaviour.

What determines which assets are used in transactions? We develop a framework where the extent to which assets are recognizable determines the extent to which they are acceptable in exchange—i.e. it determines their liquidity. Recognizability and liquidity are endogenized by allowing agents to invest in information. We analyse the effects of monetary policy. There can be multiple equilibria, with different transaction patterns, and these patterns are not invariant to policy. We show that small changes in information may generate large responses in asset prices, allocations, and welfare. We also discuss some issues in international economics, including exchange rates and dollarization.

We propose a new inverse probability weighting (IPW) estimator for moment condition models with missing data. Our estimator is easy to implement and compares favourably with existing IPW estimators, including augmented IPW estimators, in terms of efficiency, robustness, and higher-order bias. We illustrate our method with a study of the relationship between early Black–White differences in cognitive achievement and subsequent differences in adult earnings. In our data set, the early childhood achievement measure, the main regressor of interest, is missing for many units.

Consumers respond positively to products tied to charity, particularly from sellers that are relatively new and hence have limited alternative means of assuring quality. We establish this result using data from a diverse group of eBay sellers who “experiment” with charity by varying the presence of a donation in a set of otherwise matched product listings. Most of charity's benefits accrue to sellers without extensive eBay histories. Consistent with charity serving as a quality signal, we find fewer customer complaints among charity-intensive sellers.