Abstract What are the channels through which monetary policy affects financial stability? Can (and should) central banks prevent financial crises by deviating from price stability? To what extent may monetary policy itself unintentionally breed financial vulnerabilities? We answer these questions using a New Keynesian model with capital accumulation and endogenous financial crises due to adverse selection and moral hazard in credit markets. Our findings are threefold. First, monetary policy affects the probability of a crisis both in the short run (via aggregate demand) and in the medium run (via capital accumulation). Second, the central bank can reduce the incidence of crises in the medium run by tolerating higher inflation volatility in the short run. Third, prolonged periods of loose monetary policy followed by a sharp tightening can lead to financial crises.

Abstract How do global value chain (GVC) linkages modify countries’ incentives to impose import protection? Are these linkages important determinants of trade policy in practice? We develop a new approach to modelling tariff setting with GVCs, in which optimal policy depends on the nationality of value-added content embedded in home and foreign final goods. Theory predicts that discretionary tariffs will be decreasing in the domestic content of foreign-produced final goods and the foreign content of domestically produced final goods. Using data for 14 countries between 1995 and 2015, we show that governments set lower tariffs and curb their use of temporary trade barriers where GVC linkages are strongest, consistent with theory. Turning to quantitative model counterfactuals, we find that severing GVC linkages would lead to the disappearance of tariff preferences. Further, targeted policies to decouple China from GVCs would increase the optimal tariff set by G7 countries on Chinese exports.