The purpose of this paper is to obtain the optimal competitive outputs for three different firms having constant risk utility functions.

Journal Article Dr. Hansen on the Inflationary Gap: Further Comment Get access J. J. Paunio J. J. Paunio Helsinki Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 22, Issue 2, 1954, Pages 151–152, https://doi.org/10.2307/2296289 Published: 01 January 1954

Journal Article The “Optimum Tariff” and the Cost of Exports Get access J. J. Polak J. J. Polak Washington, D.C. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 19, Issue 1, 1950, Pages 36–41, https://doi.org/10.2307/2296269 Published: 01 December 1950

Journal Article International Propagation of Business Cycles Get access J. J. Polak J. J. Polak Geneva Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 6, Issue 2, February 1939, Pages 79–99, https://doi.org/10.2307/2967392 Published: 01 February 1939

John B. Shoven, John Whalley; General Equilibrium with Taxes: A Computational Procedure and an Existence Proof12, The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 40, Iss

This paper considers why organizations use promotions, rather than just monetary bonuses, to motivate employees even though this may conflict with efficient assignment of employees to jobs. When performance is unverifiable, use of promotion reduces the incentive for managers to be affected by influence activities that would blunt the effectiveness of monetary bonuses. When employees are risk neutral, use of promotion for incentives need not distort assignments. When they are risk averse, it may—sufficient conditions for this are given. The distortion may be either to promote more employees than is efficient (the Peter Principle effect) or fewer. “Promotions serve two roles in an organization. First, they help assign people to the roles where they can best contribute to the organization's performance. Second, promotions serve as incentives and rewards.” (Milgrom and Roberts (1992, p. 364)) “Promotions are used as the primary incentive device in most organizations, including corporations, partnerships, and universities … This … is puzzling to us because promotion-based incentive schemes have many disadvantages and few advantages relative to bonus-based incentive schemes.” (Baker, Jensen and Murphy (1988, p. 600))

J. Aitchison, J. A. C. Brown; A Synthesis of Engel Curve Theory1, The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 22, Issue 1, 1 January 1954, Pages 35–46, https://

The paper analyses repeated contract negotiations involving the same buyer and seller where the contracts are linked because the buyer has persistent (but not fully permanent) private information. The size of the surplus being divided is specified as a two-state Markov chain with transitions that are synchronized with contract negotiation dates. Equilibrium involves information cycles triggered by the success or failure of aggressive demands made by the seller. Because there is persistence in the Markov chain generating the surplus, a successful demand induces the seller to make another aggressive demand in the next negotiation, since the buyer's acceptance reveals that the current surplus is large. Rejection of an aggressive demand, on the other hand, leads the seller to be pessimistic about the size of the surplus in the next contract, so the seller makes a “soft” offer that is sure to be accepted. Then, after several such offers have been accepted, the seller is optimistic enough to again make an aggressive demand, creating an information cycle. An interesting feature of this cycle is that the soft price is not constant, but declines as the cycle continues, so as to offset the buyer's option value of re-starting the cycle when the current state is bad. An explicit mapping is given for the relationship between the basic parameters and the equilibrium prices and quantities; in particular, there is a closed-form solution for the threshold belief that makes the seller indifferent between hard and soft offers.

Despite familiar arguments for diversification, many investors choose to hold significant blocks of equity in the same firm. While control benefits may explain majority blocks, most blocks are much smaller than what is generally considered necessary for control. This paper develops a theory whereby such blocks can confer to their holders partial benefits of control; in particular, small block shareholders can join together and form controlling coalitions. The implications of such a cooperative game among block shareholders for the shareholder structure within and across firms are examined. This paper predicts large investors will "create their own space" by staking out large enough blocks to deter other block investors, there will be a threshold level above which large investors are not challenged, and that the shareholder structure across firms will exhibit a particular clientele effect among block shareholders. These predictions are consistent with a preliminary review of empirical evidence.

The semiparametric efficiency bound of the mixed proportional hazard model is derived. The density factors in such a way that there exists a complete sufficient statistic for the individual heterogeneity. The efficient score is shown to be the difference between the score in the parametric direction and its conditional expectation given the sufficient statistic. Applying this result to the single-spell Weibull mixed proportional hazard model, it is shown that its information matrix is singular and there cannot exist any [square root]n-consistent estimator sequence. The information of the multi-spell Weibull mixed proportional hazard model is shown to be nonsingular in general.