A method is presented for generating test statistics that share the same first order asymptotic optimality properties of the classical statistics. Generalizing J. Neyman's work (1959), t he linearized classical statistic tests restrictions in implicit func tion form using a parameter estimator that is consistent and symptoti cally normally distributed under the alternative hypothesis. By judic ious choice of estimator and form of restrictions at which to evalua te the statistic, a class of asymptotically optimal statistics is obt ained, among which are numbered some familiar classical statistics. A n application is presented for testing common factor restrictions in a single equation dynamic regression model with moving average distu rbances.

A symmetric allocation in a continuum is "multilaterally incentive compatible" if no finite coalition of privately informed agents can manipulate it by combining deception with hidden trades of exchangeable goods. Sufficient conditions for mutilateral compatibility are that all agents face the same linear prices for exchangeable goods and that indistinguishable agents face identical budget sets. The same conditions are necessary under assumptions that extend those under which the second efficiency theorem of welfare economics holds in a continuum economy. Markets for exchangeable goods emerge as binding constraints on the set of Pareto efficient allocations with private information.