How does the shadow banking system respond to changes in capital regulation of commercial banks? We propose a quantitative general equilibrium model with regulated and unregulated banks to study the unintended consequences of regulation. Tighter capital requirements for regulated banks cause higher convenience yield on debt of all banks, leading to higher shadow bank leverage and a larger shadow banking sector. At the same time, tighter regulation eliminates the subsidies to commercial banks from deposit insurance, reducing the competitive pressures on shadow banks to take risks. The net effect is a safer financial system with more shadow banking. Calibrating the model to data on financial institutions in the US, the optimal capital requirement is around 16%.

We study the interaction between the currency choice of private domestic contracts and optimal monetary policy. The optimal currency choice depends on the price risk of each currency, as well as on the covariance of its price and the relative consumption needs of the agents signing the contract. When a larger share of contracts is denominated in local currency, the government can use inflation more effectively to either redistribute resources or reduce default costs, which makes local currency more attractive for private contracts. When governments lack commitment, competitive equilibria can be constrained inefficient, thus providing a reason to regulate the currency choice of private contracts. We show that both the equilibrium use of local currency and the implications for regulation depend on the level of domestic policy risk. Our model can explain the wide use of the US dollar in international trade contracts and the observed hysteresis in dollarization.

We propose a new approach to estimating central bank preferences, including the implicit inflation target, that requires no priors on the underlying macroeconomic structure nor observation of monetary policy actions. Our approach entails directly estimating the central bank’s objective function from the sentiment expressed by policymakers in their internal meetings. We apply the approach to the objective function of the U.S. Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). The results challenge two key aspects of conventional wisdom regarding FOMC preferences. First, the FOMC had an implicit inflation target of approximately 1\frac12% on average over our baseline 2000–11 sample period, significantly below the commonly assumed value of 2. Second, the FOMC’s loss depends strongly on output growth and stock market performance and less so on their perception of current economic slack.

Using a broad panel of advanced economies, we document that increases in GDP per capita are associated with a systematic shift in the composition of value added to sectors that are intensive in high-skill labour, a process we label as skill-biased structural change. It follows that further development in these economies leads to an increase in the relative demand for skilled labour. We develop a quantitative two-sector model of this process as a laboratory to assess the sources of the rise of the skill premium in the U.S. and a set of ten other advanced economies, over the period 1977 to 2005. For the U.S., we find that the sector-specific skill neutral component of technical change accounts for 18–24% of the overall increase of the skill premium due to technical change, and that the mechanism through which this component of technical change affects the skill premium is via skill-biased structural change.