We consider a Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson trade model with two lobbies, representing the interests of factor owners, and two political parties. The lobbies contribute resources to politics, equating their returns to political and economic activity at the margin, while the parties maximize their probability of election, trading off general voter dissatisfaction with protection against the electioneering resources that favorable policies attract from the lobbies. The equilibrium level of protection of a factor and its expected rate of return increase with its relative endowment. If this relative endowment is high (low) then the factor will be better (worse) off than under free trade but at intermediate factor endowment ratios, both factors will be worse off. Under parameter changes making lobbies more sensitive to the commodity price, the lobbies contribute more resources to politics and can both be worse off even though the parties are proposing lower trade distortions.

If the representative consumer of a country is risk averse then the choice of trade controls must take account of their effects on the fluctuations of domestic real income. If the world price of the importable is uncertain and risk aversion is high then the optimal policy for achieving a ceiling on expected imports involves a reduction in imports and a rise in the domestic price as the world price falls. Moreover, a quota is superior to a tariff in achieving the ceiling. Under domestic uncertainty, a tariff is superior to a quota but it could be optimal to reduce the domestic price as imports increase.