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Who Are the Hand-to-Mouth?

Review of Economic Studies 2025 92(3), 1293-1340 open access
Many households hold little wealth. In standard precautionary savings models, these households should not only display higher marginal propensities to consume (MPCs) but also higher future consumption growth. In contrast, we see from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics that such “hand-to-mouth” households do not display higher growth in spending. They also exhibit greater volatility of spending and adjust their spending to a greater extent through the number of categories consumed. Consistent with a role for preference heterogeneity, the panel data show that it is persistent differences across households, not current assets, that predict low consumption growth and other spending differences for the hand-to-mouth households. To identify the extent of preference heterogeneity, we consider the model of Kaplan and Violante with both liquid and illiquid assets, but allow heterogeneity in preferences. To match the data, many poor hand-to-mouth must be relatively impatient and have a high inter-temporal elasticity of substitution. The model shows that preferences predominantly explain the higher MPCs for low-asset households. Preference heterogeneity notably increases the spending impact of fiscal transfers, but only if targeted, while reducing that from interest rate cuts.

Investment Cycles and Sovereign Debt Overhang

Review of Economic Studies 2009 76(1), 1-31 open access
We characterize optimal taxation of foreign capital and optimal sovereign debt policy in a small open economy where the government cannot commit to policy and seeks to insure a risk averse domestic constituency. The expected tax on capital is shown to vary with the state of the economy, generating cyclicality in investment and debt in an environment where the first best capital stock is a constant. The government's lack of commitment induces a negative correlation between investment and the stock of government debt, a "debt overhang'' effect. If the government discounts the future at a rate higher than the market, then capital oscillates indefinitely at a level strictly below the first best. Debt relief is never Pareto improving and cannot affect the long-run level of investment. Further, restricting the government to a balanced budget can eliminate the cyclical distortion of investment.