This article reconsiders the question of optimal labour income taxes for the very rich in the context of a flexible moral hazard model. In this setting, risk is not exogenous. Rather, each agent can affect the probabilities of all possible income outcomes by allocating a fixed time endowment across a variety of distinct tasks. I prove that the optimal income tax rates on high-end earners and the optimal Pareto tail index of the pre-tax labour income distribution are both endogenously determined by agent preferences. In particular, a society with less risk-averse agents will find it optimal to impose a lower tax rate on the rich, even though its members’ choices give rise to a smaller Pareto right tail index. In contrast, this kind of negative co-movement between inequality and optimal tax rates is a suboptimal response in the classical Mirrlees (1971)–Diamond (1998)–Saez (2001) setup to changes in the exogenous distribution of skills.

Since the collapse of the Bretton Woods monetary system, the monies of the developed world have been unbacked by any formal promise of convertibility. Yet, inflation has typically undershot, not overshot, central bank targets over the past couple decades. The low, while generally positive, inflation rate has (more arguably) been associated with low output and low growth. In this article, I consider these observations through the lens of a class of representative agent rational expectations models with nominal (price-setting) frictions and the possibility of firm entry/exit. I show that for any level of nominal frictions (no matter how small) and for any monetary policy rule that satisfies a set of weak restrictions, there is a large set of equilibria that exhibit permanently low inflation, low output, and low nominal interest rates. These equilibria can only exhibit positive long-run inflation if growth is low and the specification of nominal frictions (i.e. the Phillips curve) takes an unconventional but nonetheless empirically plausible form.

In this paper, we consider an environment in which agents ’ productivities are private information, potentially multi-dimensional, and follow arbitrary stochastic processes. We allow for arbitrary incentive-compatible and physically feasible tax schemes. We prove that it is typically Pareto optimal to have positive capital taxes. As well, we prove that in any given period, it is Pareto optimal to tax consumption goods at a uniform rate. All, University of Minnesota and the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Kocherlakota acknowledges the

We consider an environment in which individuals receive income shocks that are unobservable to others and can privately store resources. We provide a simple characterization of the unique efficient allocation of consumption in cases in which the rate of return on storage is sufficiently high or, alternatively, in which the worst possible outcome is sufficiently dire. We show that, unlike in environments without unobservable storage, the symmetric efficient allocation of consumption is decentralizable through a competitive asset market in which individuals trade riskfree bonds among themselves.