Journal Article Intermediation with Costly Bilateral Exchange Get access Robert M. Townsend Robert M. Townsend Carnegie-Mellon University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 45, Issue 3, October 1978, Pages 417–425, https://doi.org/10.2307/2297244 Published: 01 October 1978 Article history Received: 01 February 1976 Accepted: 01 October 1977 Published: 01 October 1978

Intergenerational Equity and Exhaustible Resources Get access R. M. Solow R. M. Solow Massachusetts Institute of Technology Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 41, Issue 5, December 1974, Pages 29–45, https://doi.org/10.2307/2296370 Published: 01 December 1974

K. R. MacCrimmon, M. Toda; The Experimental Determination of Indifference Curves1, The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 36, Issue 4, 1 October 1969, Page

Why is it difficult to restructure sovereign debt in a timely manner? In this paper, we present a theory of the sovereign debt-restructuring process in which delay arises as individual creditors hold up a settlement in order to extract greater payments from the sovereign. We then use the theory to analyse recent policy proposals aimed at ensuring equal repayment of creditor claims. Strikingly, we show that such collective action policies may increase delay by encouraging free riding on negotiation costs, even while preventing hold-up and reducing total negotiation costs. A calibrated version of the model can account for observed delays and finds that free riding is quantitatively relevant: whereas in simple low-cost debt-restructuring operations, collective mechanisms will reduce delay by more than 60%, in high-cost complicated restructurings, the adoption of such mechanisms results in a doubling of delay.

We examine a model of long-term contracting in which the buyer is privately informed about the stochastic process by which her value for a good evolves. In addition, the realized values are also private information. We characterize a class of environments in which the profit-maximizing long-term contract offered by a monopolist takes an especially simple structure: we derive sufficient conditions on primitives under which the optimal contract consists of a menu of deterministic sequences of static contracts. Within each sequence, higher realized values lead to greater quantity provision; however, an increasing proportion of buyer types are excluded over time, eventually leading to inefficiently early termination of the relationship. Moreover, the menu choices differ by future generosity, with more costly (up front) plans guaranteeing greater quantity provision in the future. Thus, the seller screens process information in the initial period and then progressively screens across realized values so as to reduce the information rents paid in future periods.

R. Sato, M. Beckmann; Neutral Inventions and Production Functions: an Addendum, The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 35, Issue 3, 1 July 1968, Pages 366,

R. Sato, M. J. Beckmann; Neutral Inventions and Production Functions1, The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 35, Issue 1, 1 January 1968, Pages 57–66, htt

We study the effects of fiscal policy interventions in a liquidity trap in a model with nominal rigidities and an interest rate rule. In a liquidity trap caused by a self-fulfilling state of low confidence, higher government spending has deflationary effects that reduce the spending multiplier when the zero lower bound is binding. Instead, cuts in marginal labour tax rates are inflationary and become more expansionary when the zero lower bound is binding. These findings contradict a popular view, based on a liquidity trap caused by a fundamental shock such as a taste shock, that higher government spending is inflationary and can therefore be associated with large multipliers at the zero lower bound, while lower marginal tax rates are deflationary and therefore counterproductive.