Journal Article Optimal Depletion of an Uncertain Stock Get access Richard J. Gilbert Richard J. Gilbert University of California Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 46, Issue 1, January 1979, Pages 47–57, https://doi.org/10.2307/2297171 Published: 01 January 1979 Article history Received: 01 July 1976 Accepted: 01 May 1977 Published: 01 January 1979

The public good aspect of entry prevention is examined in an industry characterized by an established oligopoly facing a potential entrant. Although incumbent firms act noncooperatively, underinvestment in entry-deterrence does not occur and in fact incumbents may find themselves in a Pareto dominated arrangement (in terms of profits) by preventing entry.

This paper examines the interactions between market structure and resource allocation over time when there is endogenous technical progress. The structures considered are a planned economy, pure monopoly, and competition with patent rights. In an efficient allocation the date of invention coincides with the date of innovation (the date at which technology is used). This is also true with a pure monopoly, but monopoly retards technical progress relative to the efficient level. Competition for patents rights to a new technology results in excessively rapid technical progress if the resource endowment of the economy is sufficiently large. Also, competition may lead to “sleeping patents” where invention strictly precedes the date of innovation.