We study the optimal monetary policy in a two-country open-economy model under two monetary arrangements: (a) multiple currencies controlled by independent policy makers; (b) common currencies with a centralized policy maker. Our findings suggest that: (i) monetary policy competition leads to higher long-term inflation and interest rates with large welfare losses; (ii) the inflation bias and the consequent losses are larger when countries are unable to commit to future policies; (iii) the welfare losses from higher long-term inflation dominates the welfare costs of losing the ability to react optimally to shocks.

The authors use a dynamic general equilibrium model to obtain quantitative estimates of the welfare cost of nominal wage contracting. They find that the welfare cost of such contracts can vary quite a lot depending on the degree of indexation, the size and persistence of monetary shocks, and the contract length. The size and persistence of technology shocks do not affect the welfare cost significantly. The elasticity of labor supply is important for the welfare cost. If the labor supply elasticity is small, the welfare cost of nominal wage contracts can be substantial.

We show that a change in organizational structure from partnerships to public companies—which weakens contractual commitment—can lead to higher investment in high return-and-risk activities, higher productivity (value added per employee) and greater income dispersion (inequality). These predictions are consistent with the observed evolution of the financial sector where the switch from partnerships to public companies has been especially important in the decades that preceded the 21st Century financial crisis.