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Afriat and Revealed Preference Theory

Review of Economic Studies 1973 40(3), 419
Journal Article Afriat and Revealed Preference Theory Get access W. E. Diewert W. E. Diewert University of British Columbia Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 40, Issue 3, July 1973, Pages 419–425, https://doi.org/10.2307/2296461 Published: 01 July 1973

A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames: A Correction

Review of Economic Studies 1973 40(3), 435
The purpose of this note is to correct an error in my paper [1]. Under the assumptions of the paper, Proposition 3 is not, in general, true. The point at which the proof goes awry is in the use of the mapping n. n is treated in the paper as if it were a function (i.e. a point to point mapping); whereas it is in fact a correspondence (a point to set mapping). n maps points of the unit simplex into itself, using a subset of the Pareto optimal set to obtain the simplex. A given point in the payoff space may be the image of more than one point in the strategy space. Each strategy, s, which maps into a given point in the Pareto optimal set (i.e. which has a given p associated with it in the simplex), can map into a distinct (j in the simplex. Thus the Brouwer theorem cannot be used. While n is surely upper semi-continuous, it need not have convex image sets, ruling out use of the Kakutani fixed point theorem. Furthermore, it need not be lower semi-continuous, ruling out another route to the use of the Brouwer theorem. That route is to use the results of E. Michael [2], which establish that if n is lower semi-continuous, then it has a selection which is a continuous function from the unit simplex into itself. The upshot is that the axioms of [1] must be somehow strengthened in one of the